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JUDGE-MADE LAW AND THE PRESUMPTION OF




The Second Circuit has provided significant judicial leader-
ship in the interpretation of the United States Arbitration Act
(the "Act") since its passage in 1925.1 Through the innovative
use of precedent and the careful weighing of the issues before it,
the Second Circuit's decisions have contributed to the strong ap-
plication of the Act and have, for the most part, conformed with
the Act's own terms. In 1959, however, a "presumption of arbi-
trability" was engrafted onto the Act by a Second Circuit panel
perhaps concerned more about easing congested court calendars
than about fairly adjudicating private rights. In recent years the
United States Supreme Court has adopted the Second Circuit's
presumption of arbitrability and has made it the key to the ap-
plication of the Act. In so doing, the Supreme Court has inflated
the Arbitration Act and distorted the doctrines to be followed in
applying it.
In 1991 the Second Circuit decided David L. Threlkeld &
Co. v. Metallgesellschaft Ltd.2 and followed current Supreme
Court doctrine in enforcing an ends-oriented view of the Act. In
the process, the court created new doctrine that will further im-
balance the Second Circuit's consideration of threshold issues of
arbitrability. This Article will examine the interplay of Second
Circuit and Supreme Court precedent in the development of
doctrines of arbitrability under the Act. Next, this Article will
explore the reasoning and implications of the Threlkeld
* 923 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. dismissed per stipulation, 112 S. Ct. 17 (1991).
** Attorney, New York City. B.A., Yale University, 1978; J.D., Northwestern Uni-
versity School of Law, 1983; MA, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts
University, 1984.
' Act of February 12, 1925, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883, codified at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq.
- 923 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1991).
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decision.
I. THE UNITED STATES ARBITRATION ACT
In 1923 Congress was asked by the American Bar Associa-
tion and a variety of commercial organizations to enact legisla-
tion for a narrow and specific purpose. s These advocates wanted
a federal law to make freely negotiated predispute arbitration
agreements enforceable in federal courts. The "evil to be cor-
rected"' 4 was a common law doctrine that often made it impossi-
ble for parties to arbitration agreements to compel other parties
to comply with their contractual commitments to arbitrate dis-
putes.' The doctrine was so ancient that common law courts felt
compelled to obey it even when they found the policy it repre-
sented to be anachronistic.6 A statute was needed to abrogate
this principle of the common law.
Proponents of arbitration had already succeeded in enacting
statutes in New York7 and New Jersey8 to make predispute arbi-
tration agreements enforceable in the courts of those jurisdic-
tions. State legislation could not change the treatment given to
arbitration by federal courts, however, because arbitration acts
were considered procedural laws concerned with remedies rather
than rights, and federal courts followed federally prescribed pro-
cedures.10 Only an act of Congress could release federal judges
3 The arbitration bill was submitted on January 31, 1923 by Senator Sterling (as S.
4214) and by Representative Mills (as H.R. 13522). 1923 CONG. R.c. 732, 797, 67th Cong.,
4th Sess. The same afternoon a hearing on the bill was held by the Senate Judiciary
Committee. Sales and Contracts to Sell in Interstate and Foreign Commerce, and Fed-
eral Commercial Arbitration, Hearing before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 67th Cong., 4th Sess. (1923) [hereinafter 1923 Hearings]. Suggestions were made by
the Senate subcommittee of areas for improvement in the bill, id. at 9-11, and the bill
was resubmitted in 1924 (as S. 1005 and H.R. 646). Arbitration of Interstate Commer-
cial Disputes, Joint Hearings before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1924) [hereinafter 1924 Joint Hearings].
1924 Joint Hearings, supra note 3, at 34-35 (brief of J. Cohen).
5 See 1924 Joint Hearings, supra note 3, at 33 (statement of J. Cohen) (citing
cases).
o See 1924 Joint Hearings, supra note 3, at 39 (brief of J. Cohen); H. Baum & L.
Pressman, The Enforcement of Commercial Arbitration Agreements in the Federal
Courts, 8 N.Y.U. L. REv. 238-43 (1931).
7 N.Y. CiV. PRAC. L. & R. 7501 (McKinney 1980).
1 1923 N.J. LAWS ch. 134, §1 et seq., codified as amended, at N.J. STAT. ANN. ch. 24
(West 1987).
o See 1924 Joint Hearings, supra note 3, at 16 (statement of J. Cohen).
o See id., supra note 3, at 17 ("The theory on which you do this is that you have
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from the dead hand of the common law and make arbitration
agreements enforceable in courts of the United States.
A. Congressional Intent
Legislators considering the arbitration bill noted the array
of organizations supporting the bill and the apparent lack of or-
ganized opposition." Yet clearly discernible in the legislative
history is their concern that the legislation they were called
upon to enact might prove to be unfair in some respect.
The principal witness at the joint congressional hearing on
the arbitration bill was Julius Cohen, the main draftsman of the
proposed act. Early in his prepared testimony, Cohen briefly
mentioned "300 years" of judicial disfavor for arbitration, but
his prepared remarks gave no explanation of the reasons for that
disfavor.12 The Chairman interrupted to ask Cohen to explain
"the reason for the rule, as you understand it, that a contract for
arbitration is not enforceable in equity." 13 Cohen initially dis-
cussed the possibility that one of Lord Coke's early decisions
may have been misunderstood 4 and the possibility that some
courts were jealous of their jurisdiction, powers and emolu-
ments.15 Then Cohen got to the heart of the concern of equity
courts, as he saw it:
But the fundamental reason for it, when you come to dig into the
history of it-the real fundamental cause was that at the time this
rule was made people were not able to take care of themselves in mak-
ing contracts, and the stronger men would take advantage of the
weaker, and the courts had to come in and protect them. And the
the right to tell the Federal courts how to proceed.").
11 Id. at 11 (statement of W. Piatt); id. at 13 (statement of J. Cohen); id. at 24
(colloquy between Representative Dyer and the Chairman).
1" Id. at 14 (statement of J. Cohen) ("[Tihe difficulty has been that for over 300
years, for reasons which it would take me too long to undertake too explain at this
time, the courts have said that that kind of an agreement was one that was revocable at
any time.") (emphasis added).
13 Id.
14 "A dictum of Lord Coke in Vynior's Case, established the doctrine of revocability,
based, apparently, on the theory of delegation of powers to arbitrators." Baum & Pres3-
man, supra note 6, at 240 (referring to Vynior's Case, 8 Co. 302, 77 Eng. Rep. 597
(1609)).
15 These are the explanations that found their way into the committee reports and
into subsequent attempts to reconstruct legislative intent. See HR Rzp. No. 96, 68th
Cong. 1st Sess. 1-2 (1924); S. REP. No. 536, 68th Cong. 1st Sess. 2 (1924); Scherk v. Al-
berto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510 n.4 (1974).
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courts said, "If you let the people sign away their rights, the powerful
people will come in and take away the rights of the weaker ones." And
that still is true to a certain extent.16
Although Cohen wished to continue on with his prepared
testimony, the Chairman held him back, expressing concern that
railroads were using their unequal bargaining power to coerce
shippers into signing arbitration agreements. Cohen assured the
chairman that federal freight transportation law adequately pro-
tected the interests of shippers, but he failed to address squarely
the underlying issue of unequal bargaining power and contracts
of adhesion. 17
The Chairman's next interruption came when Cohen was
discussing the right to a jury trial. The Chairman wanted to
make sure that the jury trial was preserved on "the issue [of]
whether there is an agreement to arbitrate or not." 8 This con-
cern for the rights of the party opposing arbitration is also re-
flected in both the House and Senate Committee Reports.1 9 The
Senate Report declared that "[t]he constitutional right to a jury
trial is adequately safeguarded. ' 20 The House Report stated that
"[i]f one party is recalcitrant he can no longer escape his agree-
ment, but his rights are amply protected.
'21
In short, in enacting the United States Arbitration Act into
law, Congress consciously adopted an evenhanded approach. On
the one hand, Congress protected the contractual rights of par-
ties entitled to arbitration by making their agreements to arbi-
trate specifically enforceable in federal courts. Congress also
protected their procedural rights in section 4 of the Act; it pro-
vided for a joining of issues by the parties within five days after
6 1924 Joint Hearings, supra note 3, at 15 (statement of J. Cohen). To some extent
this testimony is reflected in the Senate Report. S. REP. No. 536, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 2
(1924).
'7 1924 Joint Hearings, supra note 3, at 15.
'8 Id. at 17.
" The Chairman's concern for fairness and protection of unwilling parties may also
be reflected in the phrasing of a somewhat cryptic question he asked of an earlier wit-
ness. Mr. Charles Bernheimer was in the midst of discussing committees that had been
set up overseas in various countries by chambers of commerce and other organizations to
facilitate the arbitration of commercial disputes, when the Chairman inquired: "[T]he
committees are voluntary committees?" Id. at 8 (statement of C. Bernheimer) (emphasis
added).
20 S. REP. No. 536, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1924).
21 H.R. REP No. 96, 68th Cong. 1st Sess. 2 (1924).
[Vol. 58: 279
PRESUMPTION OF ARBITRABILITY
service of process with a speedy determination to follow.22
On the other hand, Congress protected the contractual and
procedural rights of parties opposed to arbitration by providing
a fair hearing on all issues concerning "the making of the agree-
ment for arbitration or the failure to comply therewith.123 Sec-
tion 4 of the Act requires that "[i]f the making of the arbitration
agreement or the failure, neglect, or refusal to perform the same
be in issue, the courts shall proceed summarily to the trial
thereof.'24 Section 4 specifically grants the right of jury trial to
the party opposing the motion.25 If a jury is to be empaneled, it
is to have the power to rule on issues of whether a valid agree-
ment for arbitration was made in writing and whether there was
a default in proceeding under that agreement.2 Thus procedural
safeguards were built into the Act by Congress to ensure that no
one would be deprived of a right to trial unless he or she had
already voluntarily agreed to waive it.
B. Initial Interpretations
Federal courts interpreted the Arbitration Act on a case-by-
case basis in the years following its enactment, applying its pro-
visions to ascertain fairly the contractual intentions of the par-
ties and to enforce valid arbitration agreements when the matter
in dispute fell within their parameters. From 1952 to 1962, how-
ever, concerns over issues of federalism and the interplay be-
tween the policies of the Arbitration Act and other federal stat-
utes led the Supreme Court to decide three cases that gave
Arbitration Act jurisprudence a distinct shape.
1. Wilko v. Swan
The first such case was Wilko v. Swan.27 In Wilko a cus-
2 Act of Feb. 12, 1925, ch. 213 § 4, 43 Stat. 883 (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. § 4
(1947)).
23 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1925).
24 Id.
25 Id. It does not appear that the party who is moving for arbitration is granted a
statutory right to jury trial upon this issue by section 4. The reason for the omission is
undoubtedly that a party seeking to enforce an arbitration agreement must concede that
he has waived his right to a jury trial. The right to a jury, therefore, was clearly provided
solely for the purpose of protecting parties opposing arbitration.
28 Id.
= 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson American Ex-
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tomer of a securities brokerage firm brought suit against the
brokerage, claiming that he had been induced to buy securities
by false representations made to him by a broker. Wilko's con-
tract with the brokerage firm contained an arbitration clause.
The Court observed that "two policies, not easily reconcilable,
are involved in this case. ' 28 The first policy, expressed by section
2 of the Arbitration Act, made arbitration clauses "valid, irrevo-
cable, and enforceable. ' 2 The second policy, expressed by sec-
tion 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933,30 authorized any pur-
chaser of a security who had been damaged by a seller's failure
to comply with the Securities Act to sue the seller "either at law
or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction." 31 Section 14
of the Securities Act declared "void" any "condition, stipulation,
or provision binding any person acquiring any security to waive
compliance with any provision" of the Securities Act.32 The case
came to the Supreme Court on certiorari from the Second Cir-
cuit. The Second Circuit had held that the Securities Act did
not prohibit predispute agreements to refer securities claims to
arbitration and had enforced the arbitration agreement against
Wilko.33
The Supreme Court reversed. In its parsing of the two stat-
utes involved, the Court found that the Securities Act had been
"drafted with an eye to the disadvantages under which buyers
labor. '3 4 The Wilko Court noted Congress's concern that buyers
of securities often have less access to information about securi-
ties than do sellers and that, as a consequence, buyers and sell-
ers were frequently not on an equal footing in negotiating trans-
actions. Although the Court found that the policies of the two
acts were "not easily reconcilable," it reasoned that "the inten-
tion of Congress concerning the sale of securities is better car-
ried out by holding invalid ... an agreement for arbitration of
press, 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
28 Id. at 438.
29 9 U.S.C. § 2.
30 Act of May 27, 1933, ch. 38, tit. I, 48 Stat. 74, reprinted in 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa
(1981).
3' Act of May 27, 1933, ch. 38, tit. I, § 12(2), 48 Stat. 84, reprinted in 15 U.S.C. §
771(2) (1981).
2 48 Stat. 84, 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1981).
31 Wilko v. Swan, 201 F. 2d 439 (2d Cir. 1953).
24 Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 435 (1953).
[Vol. 58:279
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issues arising under the [Securities] Act. ' 35 Thus the Wilko
Court weighed the policies of the Arbitration Act against the
policies of the Securities Act of 1933 and found that Congress's
concern to preserve contractual arbitration remedies was out-
weighed and partially contradicted by Congress's concern to pro-
tect investors.3 6
2. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Company of America, Inc.
In the second of the three cases, Bernhardt v. Polygraphic
Company of America, Inc.,37 the Supreme Court for the first
time faced the application of the Erie doctrine38 to the Arbitra-
tion Act. The District Court in Vermont, sitting in diversity ju-
risdiction, had refused to enforce an arbitration clause in an em-
ployment contract between a New York corporation and its
employee who had performed his employment duties while re-
siding in Vermont."9 Under Vermont common law an agreement
to arbitrate was revocable by either party before the arbitration
award was made. Applying Erie, the trial court found that state
law supplied the rule of decision and ruled in favor of the em-
ployee, who preferred to litigate rather than arbitrate the claims
against his former employer.
The district court was reversed, however, by the Second Cir-
cuit. The Second Circuit reasoned that section 3 of the Arbitra-
tion Act4" made no express reference to the maritime or com-
merce powers of Congress. Therefore, section 3 of the Act rested
on Congress's power to govern the conduct of federal judicial
proceedings. Since the Arbitration Act was perceived as essen-
Id. at 438.
Since the Chairman of the congressional panels which held hearings on the arbi-
tration bill expressed concern that arbitration clauses might be unfairly imposed as be-
tween parties having unequal power, this decision appears to have been wholly consistent
with congressional intent in the Arbitration Act.
37 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
"Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (The Erie Doctrine requires federal
courts to follow state substantive laws and federal procedural laws.).
" Federal courts have the capacity to hear "controversies... between citizens of
different States." U.S. CONST. art. ITI, § 2, cl. L This capacity is referred to in lawyer's
jargon as "diversity" jurisdiction. The scope of diversity jurisdiction is further defined at
28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1987).
"o Article 3 of the Arbitration Act empowers a federal court in which a dispute is




tially procedural in nature, federal law governed under the Erie
doctrine. Applying the federal Arbitration Act, the Second Cir-
cuit ruled that the dispute between the parties was arbitrable
and should be sent to arbitration.41
On writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court ruled that in sec-
tion 2 of the Arbitration Act Congress had expressly limited the
Act's scope to contracts within the scope of Congress's com-
merce and maritime powers. Section 3 of the Act could not be
read apart from this limitation.42 The Court found that Con-
gress's power to pass the Arbitration Act did not derive from its
power to define the procedures to be followed by the federal ju-
diciary because the contractual choice of forum for the determi-
nation of a controversy was a matter of substantive rather than
procedural law. Thus the Court held that the Arbitration Act
did not apply. Vermont law controlled Bernhardt's employment
contract because his employment in Vermont did not involve in-
terstate or foreign commerce.4 3
3. United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf
Navigation Co.
The Supreme Court's reading of congressional policies con-
cerning federalism and investor protection, and its concern for
the Act's constitutionality, led the Court to define the Act's lim-
its. Another case involving Congress's national labor policies led
to an expansive application of the Act in the field of labor rela-
tions. United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navi-
gation Co.44 was one of a series of cases that dealt with the scope
of arbitration agreements under the Labor-Management Rela-
tions Act of 1947. In Warrior & Gulf the issue was how broadly
to construe an arbitration clause in a collective bargaining agree-
ment. The steelworkers sought to compel their employer to arbi-
trate a dispute that arose when the employer dismissed some of
its union employees and then contracted out the work they had
performed to nonunion contractors. The lower court dismissed
the union's complaint because, according to its interpretation of
the collective bargaining agreement, the arbitration clause in
41 Bernhardt, 218 F.2d 948 (2d Cir. 1955).
42 Bernhardt, 350 U.S. 198, 202 (1956).
Id. at 200.
363 U.S. 574 (1960).
[Vol. 58:279
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question did not give the arbitrator the right to review the em-
ployer's business judgment in contracting out work . 5 The Fifth
Circuit affirmed.46
In a sweeping decision with broad implications for federal
labor law, the Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit and
sent the dispute to arbitration.47 In Warrior & Gulf the Court
held that arbitration clauses found in collective bargaining
agreements were to be construed broadly. Noting the important
role arbitration clauses played in labor-management relation-
ships governed by federal labor legislation, the Court held that
"[It]he collective bargaining agreement is... more than a con-
tract; it is a generalized code to govern a myriad of cases which
the draftsmen cannot wholly anticipate."'8 The Court noted that
"[t]he present federal policy is to promote industrial stabiliza-
tion through the collective bargaining agreement. A major factor
in achieving industrial peace is the inclusion of a provision for
arbitration of grievances in the collective bargaining agree-
ment."49 Finding that the grievance machinery under a collective
bargaining agreement is the engine of industrial self-government
and that arbitration was an essential part of that grievance ma-
chinery, the Court reasoned that "[a]part from matters that the
parties specifically exclude, all of the questions on which the
parties disagree must therefore come within the scope of the
grievance and arbitration provisions of the collective agree-
ment."5 The Court concluded that in suits brought in federal
court under section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations
Act,51 "[a]n order to arbitrate the particular grievance should
not be denied unless it may be said with positive assurance that
the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that
covers the asserted dispute. Doubts should be resolved in favor
of coverage.
'52
5 168 F. Supp. 702 (S.D. Ala. 1958).
"a 269 F.2d 633 (5th Cir. 1959).
47 363 U.S. 574, 585 (1960).
48 Id. at 578.
41 Id. (footnotes and citations omitted).
0Id. at 581.
-1 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1947).
512 363 U.S. at 582-83 (footnote omitted). The Court was clear about the strength of
the presumption of arbitrability it imposed in the labor grievance context:
In the absence of any express provision excluding a particular grievance from
arbitration, we think only the most forceful evidence of purpose to exclude the
1992]
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The doctrine of Warrior & Gulf is particularly notable for
the way it distinguished labor arbitration from commercial arbi-
tration. The Court justified its requirement that courts give ar-
bitration clauses under the Labor-Management Relations Act a
broad reading by noting that the essential role arbitration
played in ensuring the success of the national labor policy had
no parallel in the commercial context. "In the commercial case,
arbitration is the substitute for litigation. Here arbitration is the
substitute for industrial strife. Since arbitration of labor dis-
putes has quite different functions from arbitration under an or-
dinary commercial agreement, the lostility evinced by courts to-
ward arbitration of commercial agreements has no place here.", 3
The Court noted that commercial arbitration agreements and
those in the labor context arise from very different
considerations:
A collective bargaining agreement is an effort to erect a system of in-
dustrial self-government. When most parties enter into a contractual
relationship they do so voluntarily, in the sense that there is no real
compulsion to deal with one another, as opposed to dealing with other
parties. That is not true of the labor agreement.
Courts and arbitration in the context of most commercial con-
tracts are resorted to because there has been a breakdown in the
working relationship of the parties; such resort is the unwanted excep-
tion. But the grievance machinery under a collective bargaining agree-
ment is at the very heart of the system of industrial self-government.
... The processing of disputes through the grievance machinery is
actually a vehicle by which meaning and content are given to the col-
lective bargaining agreement."
In concluding that labor arbitration agreements should be
liberally construed, the majority's reasoning relied exclusively
upon considerations of national labor policy, which do not apply
in the ordinary commercial context. The Court's reliance upon
national labor policies to justify its holding in Warrior & Gulf
compels the conclusion that the policies of the Arbitration Act
alone could not justify the broad reading the Court gave to labor
claim from arbitration can prevail, particularly where, as here, the exclusion
clause is vague and the arbitration clause quite broad.
Id. at 584-85.
11 Id. at 578.
" Id. at 580-81.
[Vol. 58: 279
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arbitration agreements 5 Thus the reasoning of Warrior & Gulf
provides no support for the broad interpretation of arbitration
clauses in commercial cases. The very reasoning of the Court ar-
gues against it.
C. The Second Circuit's Influence on the Supreme Court
1. Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics Inc.
While the Supreme Court was defining the scope of the Act,
the Second Circuit was defining its nature. In Robert Lawrence
Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics Inc.,5" a diversity case involving a dis-
pute between merchants, the Second Circuit addressed the Erie-
related issue that the Supreme Court had left open in Bernhardt
v. Polygraphic.57 The Second Circuit ruled that by invoking the
Commerce Clause and congressional powers over admiralty im-
plied in the Constitution, Congress had intended to create fed-
eral substantive law to govern all cases that came within Con-
gress's dommerce and admiralty powers." This federal law was
to be interpreted by federal courts and encompassed "questions
of interpretation and construction as well as questions of valid-
ity, revocability and enforceability of arbitration agreements...
since these two types of legal questions are inextricably
intertwined." 59
Applying federal common law (which it had just created),
the Second Circuit examined the claim that the defendant's
fraud in inducing the plaintiff to enter into a contract for the
purchase of goods was a "ground ... for the revocation of any
contract"6 0 and that therefore, under section 2 of the Act, the
11 The Court was evidently unanimous in this opinion. Justice Whittaker, who wrote
a dissenting opinion, declared that the majority's rule of liberal construction "is an en-
tirely new and strange doctrine to me. I suggest, with deference, that it departs from
both the contract of the parties and the controlling decisions of this Court." 363 U.S.
574, 585-89 (Whittaker, J., dissenting). "Our own favor or disfavor of the cause of arbi-
tration is not to count as a factor in the appraisal of the thought of others." Id. at 589
(quoting Judge Cardozo in Marchant v. Mead-Morrison Mfg. Co., 252 N.Y. 284, 299, 169
N.E. 386, 391 (1929)).
271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. granted, 362 U.S. 909, cert. dismissed per stipu-
lation, 364 U.S. 801 (1960). The panel that decided this case included Judge Lumbard,
who also participated in the Threlkeld decision.
" 350 U.S. 198 (1956); see supra notes 37-43 and accompanying text.
I 271 F.2d at 404-09.
Id. at 409.
9 U.S.C. § 2 (1947).
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arbitration provision in the contract was unenforceable against
the plaintiff. New York law, which was normally to be applied in
a diversity case in New York under the Erie doctrine and the
Rules of Decision Act,61 would have made the contract as a
whole unenforceable, including the arbitration clause. 2
The Second Circuit looked to the provisions of the Arbitra-
tion Act to determine whether the same results should apply
under federal law. Reasoning that "any doubts as to construc-
tion of the Act ought to be resolved in line with its liberal policy
of promoting arbitration both to accord with the original inten-
tion of the parties and to help ease the current congestion of
court calendars,"63 the court found that arbitration clauses were
severable. The Robert Lawrence court decided that fraud in the
inducement could be a ground to deny enforcement of an arbi-
tration clause only when the fraud went to the formation of the
clause itself, absent contrary expressions of intent by the par-
ties. 4 Since there was no allegation that the arbitration clause in
the case before it was separately induced by fraud, the Second
Circuit sent the parties' dispute-including the dispute whether
the entire contract was voided by fraud-to arbitration. 5
2. Prima Paint v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co.
The Second Circuit's analysis in Robert Lawrence began to
affect the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Act in commer-
cial cases, such as Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manu-
facturing Co.6 6 In Prima Paint a company that had contracted
to receive services under a commercial consulting agreement
sued in diversity for rescission of that agreement, claiming that
the consulting firm had fraudulently induced it to enter into the
contract. According to the complaint, the consulting firm had
failed to reveal that it was about to file a bankruptcy petition,
which would have rendered it unable to provide the services
called for in the consulting agreement. When the consulting firm
moved to enforce the arbitration clause contained in the consult-
41 Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1948).
2 271 F.2d at 412.
' Id. at 410.
Id. at 409-410.
6' Id. at 411, 413.
" 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
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ing agreement, the plaintiff argued that the arbitration clause
was unenforceable under the express terms of the Arbitration
Act. The plaintiff relied upon section 2 of the Act, which de-
clares arbitration clauses to be "valid, irrevocable, and enforcea-
ble, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.16 7 The plaintiff argued that the
Court was required under the Erie doctrine to apply state law in
a diversity case to determine what "grounds . . . exist at law or
in equity for the revocation of any contract."6 8 Under New York
law fraud in the inducement entitled the plaintiff to rescind the
contract. Accordingly, the plaintiff argued that the arbitration
clause was unenforceable under section 2 of the Arbitration
Act.6 9 Following Second Circuit precedent, the district court
granted the defendant's motion to stay the action pending arbi-
tration. The Second Circuit dismissed the plaintiff's appeal.70
The Supreme Court assumed for the sake of argument that
fraud in the inducement could be a basis for rescission of a con-
tract under state law. 7 ' As it interpreted the Arbitration Act,
however, fraud in the inducement of the contract as a whole
would not be a sufficient basis to invalidate an arbitration clause
contained in the agreement. Reading section 2 of the Act to-
gether with section 4, the Supreme Court noted that section 4
instructs a federal court
to order arbitration to proceed once it is satisfied that "the making of
the agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply [with the arbi-
tration agreement] is not in issue." Accordingly, if the claim is fraud
in the inducement of the arbitration clause itself-an issue which goes
to the "making" of the agreement to arbitrate-the federal court may
proceed to adjudicate it. But the statutory language does not permit
the federal court to consider claims of fraud in the inducement of the
contract generally. 2
Based on this reasoning, the Court affirmed the lower court's or-
der sending the dispute to arbitration, since the plaintiff's claim
of fraud in the inducement related to the entire contract as op-
posed to the specific arbitration clause of the contract.
- 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1947).
" 388 U.S. at 400, quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1947).
69 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1947).
70 Prima Paint, 360 F.2d 315 (2d Cir. 1966).
11 388 U.S. at 400 n.3.
72 Id. at 403-04 (footnotes omitted).
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Justice Black filed a vigorous dissent in Prima Paint. The
majority, in finding the arbitration clause to be severable from
the rest of the contract for purposes of determining whether
fraud in the inducement is a sufficient basis for keeping the con-
tract from arbitration, had achieved precisely the same result as
that of the Second Circuit in Robert Lawrence. The Supreme
Court's decision in Prima Paint appeared to be based on the
narrow ground of statutory construction, expressing no view on
the Second Circuit's doctrine that the Arbitration Act author-
ized federal courts to create a specific body of federal common
law.73 Nevertheless, Black believed that the majority had, in ef-
fect, interpreted the Arbitration Act to give "federal courts the
right to fashion federal law, inconsistent with state law, to deter-
mine whether an arbitration agreement was made and what it
means." 74 Black believed that making the arbitration agreement
severable from the rest of the contract made it unequal and su-
perior to other contract clauses. As he understood it, the result
of the decision-to permit someone to defraud a second party
into entering a contract and then to prevent the second party
from suing to rescind that contract because it contained an arbi-
tration clause that had not been induced by any separate
fraud-"would flout the intention of the framers of the Act." 78
Black argued that to deny a judicial forum to a party on this
basis might be a deprivation of due process of law."' He called it
"judicial legislation" and added that "Congress might possibly
have enacted such a version into law had it been able to foresee
subsequent legal events, but I do not think this Court should do
SO.")
7
D. Legislative and Judicial Extensions of the Act
1. The Legislative Extension of the Act
During the 1950s and 1960s, when courts were developing
standards for applying the Arbitration Act in interstate com-
merce, another event occurred that would prove to have signifi-
"' Id. at 421 (Black, J., dissenting) (noting the Second Circuit's forthright admission
that its decision was intended to further a "liberal policy of promoting arbitration").
74 Id. at 422.
75 Id. at 427.
76 Id. at 407.
77 Id. at 425.
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cant ramifications for international commercial arbitration. In
1958 a multilateral conference negotiated the United Nations
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Ar-
bitral Awards. 78 The Convention was the culmination of efforts
that had begun years before to make arbitral awards enforceable
throughout the world.7 9 The United States did not sign the Con-
vention in 1958 after its delegation "recommend[ed] strongly"
against doing so."0 The main reason for the delegates' objections
seems to have been a concern that it would "override the arbi-
tration laws of a substantial number of States and entail changes
in State and possibly Federal court procedures.""' A change of
political party in power and the passage of time brought about a
change of policy, however, and in 1968 the Senate ratified the
Convention."2
Although the Convention had been formally ratified by the
Senate, the United States delayed the actual deposit of the in-
strument of accession to the Convention until Congress enacted
enabling legislation to incorporate the treaty into domestic law.83
The only witness to appear at the only hearing held by Congress
on the proposed enabling legislation was Richard Kearney, an
attorney for the United States Department of State. In his testi-
mony, Kearney sought to allay any concern on the part of the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations that enactment of the
Convention might invalidate state laws or deprive parties un-
fairly of their rights to judicial determinations of their claims:
The Chairman: Whether or not this comes into effect all depends
upon an agreement entered into voluntarily b[y] the parties. Is that
correct?
Mr. Kearney- That is correct, sir.
Mr. Chairman: In other words, you are not imposing this on peo-
'I 21 U.S.T. 2517 (1958).
79 Although earlier multilateral conventions have been negotiated on the same sub-
ject, they have not achieved the result of making foreign arbitral awards uniformly and
efficiently enforceable. Leonard V. Quigley, Accession by the United States to the
United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, 70 YALE L.J. 1049, 1054-55 (1961).
1o Quigley, supra note 79, at 1074 n.108.
,Id. at 1074-75 n.108.
The Senate Act of ratification included a reservation to the United States' acces-
sion to the Convention limiting its effectiveness to commercial matters. 114 Co. G. REc
29350-53, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
" Id. at 10.
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ple who do not wish any particular procedure; is that correct?
Mr. Kearney: That is absolutely correct.
Mr. Chairman: So that what you are doing is setting up a proce-
dure by which citizens who would normally be of different countries
and who wished to resort to this method of settling their differences
could do so; is that correct?
Mr. Kearney: That is correct, sir.
Mr. Chairman: So there is no possible opposition based upon the
idea we are now reaching out and subjecting citizens to further arbi-
trary intervention of the Federal authorities or any other authorities
in their private affairs. That is not justified; is that correct?
Mr. Kearney: That is correct."'
In 1970 Congress passed enabling legislation to incorporate the
twelve-year-old Convention into United States law."5
Section 201 of the enabling legislation made the Convention
directly enforceable in the United States "in accordance with
this chapter."' Section 202 defined situations in which the Con-
vention would become applicable in disputes involving United
States citizens and others.8 7 Section 205 of the enabling act au-
thorized the removal of cases from state courts to enforce the
Convention. 8 Section 206 authorized courts to compel arbitra-
tion and to appoint arbitrators where appropriate.89 Section 207
authorized any party to the arbitration to apply for an order
confirming the award and provided that "the court shall confirm
the award unless it finds one of the grounds for refusal or defer-
ral of recognition or enforcement of the awards specified in the
set convention."9 0 Section 208 made the Federal Arbitration Act
Foreign Arbitral Awards, S. RzP No. 91-702, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1970).
Pub. L. No. 91-368, 84 Stat. 692 (July 31, 1970) (adding §§ 201-208 to 9 U.S.C).
86 "[T]his chapter" refers to chapter 2 of part 9 of the U.S. Code. 9 U.S.C. § 201
(1970).
87 9 U.S.C. § 202 (1970).
88 9 U.S.C. § 205 (1970).
88 9 U.S.C. § 206 (1970).
90 9 U.S.C. § 207 (1970). Article 5 of the Convention provides the following grounds
for refusal to recognize and enforce an arbitral award:
1. Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused, at the request of
the party against whom it is invoked, only if that party furnishes to the compe-
tent authority where the recognition and enforcement is sought, proof that:
(a) The parties to the agreement referred to in article II were, under
the law applicable to them, under some incapacity, or the said agree-
ment is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or,
failing any indication thereon, under the law of the country where the
award was made; or
(b) The party against whom the award is invoked was not given
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applicable to actions and proceedings brought under the Con-
vention "to the extent that the chapter is not in conflict with the
chapter or the Convention as ratified by the United States.' '
Nowhere in the legislative history is there apparent any be-
lief that the policy represented by the enactment of the Conven-
tion into domestic law was one of overriding public concern. As
was the case with the original Arbitration Act, Congress seemed
to be motivated by a desire to extend to international business
transactions a remedy that the Arbitration Act had provided for
interstate dealings but which could not be made fully enforcea-
ble abroad without a treaty. 2
Considering the ten-year delay between the negotiation of
the Convention and its ratification by the Senate, the two-year
delay between ratification of the Convention and its enactment
into domestic law, the lack of any evident enthusiasm or expres-
sion of strong opinion concerning the matter by legislators and
the generally technical nature of the subject matter, it is surpris-
ing how much controversy international arbitration has gener-
proper notice of the appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration
proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case; or
(c) The award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not
falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains
decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration,
provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can
be separated from those not so submitted, that part of the award which
contains decisions on matters submitted to arbitration may be recog-
nized and enforced; or
(d) The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral proce-
dure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, or, failing
such agreement, was not in accordance with the law of the country
where the arbitration took place; or
(e) The award has not yet become binding on the parties, or has
been set aside or suspended by a competent authority of the country in
which, or under the law of which, that award was made.
2. Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused
if the competent authority in the country where recognition and en-
forcement is sought finds that-
(a) The subject matter of the difference is not capable of settlement
by arbitration under the law of that country, or
(b) The recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary
to the public policy of that country.
21 U.S.T. 2517, 2520 (1958).
9- 9 U.S.C. § 208 (1970).
92 See Quigley, supra note 79, at 1055-59.
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ated in case law.93 That controversy has had less to do with the
Convention itself or its enabling act than with the manner in
which it served judicial purposes unrelated to promoting the in-
terests of business.
2. Judicial Extensions of the Act
Judges noted early on that the policy of enforcing arbitra-
tion agreements also had the salutary effect of lightening their
caseloads.94 It was generally recognized, however, that the prin-
cipal purpose of Congress in the Arbitration Act was to vindicate
private parties' contractual rights.9 5 Accordingly, courts gener-
ally provided a fairly balanced hearing for claims under the Ar-
bitration Act. Courts added no extra weight to the balance in
order to promote interests of judicial economy.
The results achieved in Robert Lawrence Co.,96 where the
Second Circuit based its decision partly upon the "liberal pol-
icy" of the Act, and in Prima Paint,97 where the majority care-
fully avoided any reference to policy, perhaps marked a step
away from Congress's intent to establish an evenhanded method
of resolving Arbitration Act disputes. Yet those decisions con-
cerned the formation of rules for interpreting the Act that were,
at least on their face, neutral. The cases established which set of
scales would be used to weigh claims of arbitrability and what
91 See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
640 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 521
(Douglas, J., dissenting), reh'g denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974).
91 See Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F. 2d 402, 410 (2d Cir.
1959). "Finally, any doubts as to the construction of the Act ought to be resolved in line
with its liberal policy of promoting arbitration both to accord with the original intention
of the parties and to help ease the current congestion of court calendars. Such policy
has been consistently reiterated by the federal courts and we think it deserves to be
heartily endorsed." Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
91 See, e.g., St. Louis Mailers' Union Local No. 3 v. Globe-Democrat Pub. Co., 350
F.2d 879, 885 (8th Cir. 1965); Local Union No. 998 v. The B. & T. Metals Co., 315 F.2d
432 (6th Cir. 1963); Metal Product Workers Union v. The Torrington Co., 242 F. Supp.
813, 824 (D. Conn. 1965); Local No. 30 v. Hyman Brodsky & Son Corp., 243 F. Supp.
728, 730 (E.D. Pa. 1964); U.S. Steel Corp. v. Seafarers' International Union, 237 F. Supp.
529, 532 (E.D. Pa. 1965); In re Utility Oil Corp., 10 F. Supp. 678, 680-81 (S.D.N.Y. 1934).
But see Insurance Agents' International Union v. Prudential Ins. Co., 122 F. Supp. 869,
872 (E.D. Pa. 1954) (ordering arbitration despite language of contract; "where the parties
have elected to submit their differences [to arbitration], the courts should not by hair
splitting decisions hamstring its operation").
:6 271 F. 2d 402, 410 (2d Cir. 1959).
7 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
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parts of a party's claims might be weighed. When it came to the
weighing, however, they did not put a thumb on the scales.
This state of affairs began to change in the 1970s. Thanks
largely to the advocacy of Chief Justice Warren Burger, the con-
gestion of court dockets became front page news"" and the sub-
ject of significant policy initiatives."8 In numerous speeches, arti-
cles and other communications, the Chief Justice expressed his
view that justice would be improved through alternative means
of resolving disputes, including mediation, arbitration and con-
ciliation. °00 By his efforts, Burger evidently hoped to stimulate
debate and promote legislation to increase the use of alternative
dispute resolution mechanisms.
a. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.
The Chief Justice's policy concerns also began to work their
way into law through decisions of the Supreme Court. This was
first evident in the Court's decision in The Bremen v. Zapata
Off-Shore Co.1°1 In Bremen the Court overturned a widely fol-
lowed doctrine that contract clauses designating a particular ju-
dicial forum as the exclusive place for litigation of disputes
under the contract were contrary to public policy and therefore
unenforceable. Under that doctrine, parties seeking to change
venue to a site chosen by a contractual clause had to show that
the balance of conveniences was strongly in favor of the contrac-
tually-chosen forum.0 2
The Bremen Court radically changed United States law
concerning choice of forum. In its opinion, authored by the Chief
Justice, the Court noted that the country had entered "an era
when all courts are overloaded .... ,,03 In such an era, "[t]he
"8 See, e.g., Hon. Warren E. Burger, Isn't There a Better Way?, 68 A.BA. J. 274
(March 1983) [hereinafter Better Way]; William H1 Erickson, The Pound Conference
Recommendations: A Blueprint for the Justice System in the Twenty-First Century, 76
F.R-D. 277 (1978); Am. Bar Assoc., Report of the Pound Conference Follow-Up Task
Force, 74 F.R.D. 159 (1976); Hon. Warren E. Burger, Agenda for 2000 A.D.-A Need for
Systematic Anticipation, 70 F.R.D. 83 (1976) [hereinafter Agenda].
"See, e.g., Raymond J. Broderick, Yes to Mandatory Court-Annexed ADR, 18
LMG. 4 (Summer 1992) ("A court-annexed mandatory arbitration program has been op-
erating in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania for the past 14 years.").
100 See e.g., Agenda, supra note 98, at 83; Better Way, supra note 98, at 275.
101 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
102 Id. at 6.
103 Id. at 12.
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argument that [choice of forum] clauses are improper because
they tend to 'oust' a court of jurisdiction is hardly more than a
vestigial legal fiction" because it "appears to rest at core on his-
torical judicial resistance to any attempt to reduce the power
and business of a particular court."'1 4 Such a doctrine "reflects
something of a provincial attitude regarding the fairness of other
tribunals.'10 The Court also voiced its opinion that the contin-
ued expansion of American business and industry depended
upon a legal regime that would not restrict its development.
In the opinion of this Court, a doctrine that prohibited the enforce-
ment of forum-choice clauses would be a heavy hand indeed on the
future of international commercial dealings by Americans. We cannot
have trade and commerce in world markets and international waters
exclusively on our terms, governed by our laws, and resolved in our
courts.
1 08
Thus the Bremen Court reversed the traditional burden applied
to the enforcement of choice of forum clauses. In the future, par-
ties seeking to oppose the enforcement of the choice of forum
clause would carry a
heavy burden of showing not only that the balance of convenience is
strongly in favor of trial in [the United States] (that is, that it will be
far more inconvenient for [the opponent] to litigate [abroad] than it
will be for [the proponent of the choice of forum clause] to litigate in
[the United States]), but also that a [foreign] trial will be so mani-
festly and gravely inconvenient to [the opponent] that it will be effec-
tively deprived of a meaningful day in court.110
b. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.
Two years later the Burger Court had the opportunity to
apply the Bremen analysis to enforcement of a predispute arbi-
tration agreement in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.'05 In Scherk
an American manufacturer had negotiated a contract to acquire
a European business, along with all rights held by that business
104 Id. The Supreme Court's unsupported observation that judicial hostility to arbi-
tration rested upon judicial jealousy was considered and rejected in the well-reasoned
opinion of the Second Circuit in Kulukundis Shipping Co., S/A v. Amtorg Trading Corp.,
126 F.2d 978, 982-84 (2d Cir. 1942).
101 Bremen, 407 U.S. at 12.
108 Id. at 9.
107 Id. at 19.
100 417 U.S. 506, reh'g denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974).
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to trademarks in certain cosmetic goods. The contract contained
warranties in which the seller guaranteed that it had sole and
unencumbered ownership of the trademarks. The contract also
contained an arbitration clause requiring arbitration of "any
controversy or claim [that] shall arise out of this agreement or
the breach thereof."109 Approximately a year after the closing of
the transaction, the purchaser discovered that the trademarks
were substantially encumbered and offered to rescind its
purchase of the European business. When the seller refused, the
manufacturer sued in federal district court, claiming that the
seller's fraudulent representations about its trademark rights
had violated section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934110 and rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder.' The seller
filed a motion to stay the action pending arbitration. Relying on
Wilko v. Swan 112 the court denied the seller's motion to stay,
finding that the policies underlying section 10(b) of the Ex-
change Act were substantially the same as the provisions of the
1933 Act on which Wilko was based and therefore the Exchange
Act took precedence over the policies of the Arbitration Act.
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. '
In reversing the lower courts, the Supreme Court relied
heavily on the international context of the dispute. Following its
decision in Bremen, the Court found that an international con-
tract "involves considerations and policies significantly different
from those found controlling in Wilko."11 4 Potential questions
relating to laws and legal policies that would govern interna-
tional disputes made it imperative for parties to international
contracts to seek ways to minimize the uncertainty involved in
international contracting.11 5 Referring directly to its decision in
109 Id. at 508.
'o 15 U.S.C. § 78j (b) (1934).
m 17 C.F.R. § 240.-1Ob-5 (1934).
112 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson American Ex-
press, 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
1- 484 F. 2d 611 (7th Cir. 1973).
124 Scherk, 417 U.S. at 515.
115 A contractual provision specifying in advance the forum in which disputes
shall be litigated and the law to be applied is, therefore, an almost indispensa-
ble precondition to achievement of the orderliness and predictability essential
to any international business transaction. Furthermore, such a provision obvi-
ates the danger that a dispute under the agreement might be submitted to a
forum hostile to the interests of one of the parties or unfamiliar with the prob-
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Bremen, the Court declared:
An agreement to arbitrate before a specified tribunal is, in effect, a
specialized kind of forum-selection clause that posits not only the si-
tus of suit but also the procedure to be used in resolving the dispute.
The invalidation of such an agreement in the case before us would not
only allow the respondent to repudiate its solemn promise but would,
as well, reflect a "parochial concept that all disputes must be resolved
under our laws and in our courts .... We cannot have trade and
commerce in world markets and international waters exclusively on
our terms, governed by our laws, and resolved in our courts."11
The Supreme Court decided that policies of the Arbitration
Act would prevail over those of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 in the international commercial context, notwithstanding
the similarity between the policies of the Exchange Act and
those of the Securities Act, which had priority in Wilko.
1"7
In its final footnote of the case, the Court declared that its
holding in Scherk "is confirmed by international developments
and domestic legislation in the area of commercial arbitration
subsequent to the Wilko decision," including the signing, ratifi-
cation and incorporation into United States law of the Conven-
tion.11 8 The Court went on to state that:
[W]ithout reaching the issue of whether the Convention, apart from
the considerations expressed in this opinion, would require of its own
force that the agreement to arbitrate be enforced in the present case,
we think that this country's adoption and ratification of the Conven-
tion and the passage of Chapter II of the U.S. Arbitration Act [the
enabling act which incorporated the Convention into U.S. law] pro-
vide strongly persuasive evidence of congressional policy consistent
with the decision we reach today." 9
It is curious that the Court, presented with new legislation
that applied specifically to the enforcement of arbitration
clauses in an international context, would decline to rely upon
that statute to determine whether an arbitration clause in an in-
lem area involved.
Id. at 516 (footnote omitted).
"I Id. at 519 (footnotes omitted) (quoting The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407
U.S. 1, 9 (1972)).
"M The Court did not reverse the burden of proof for arbitration cases in Scherk, as
it had done for choice-of-forum clauses in Bremen. The issue was not raised by the facts
before the Court.




ternational contract should be enforced. In Scherk the Court
specifically relied upon the international character of the dispute
to distinguish the case from its apparently contrary holding in
the domestic context in Wilko. The explanation for this judicial
choice may lie in the precedential effect of employing the Act,
rather than the Convention. A more narrowly-based decision re-
lying upon the Convention would have had precedential weight
in an international, but not domestic, context. However, by tak-
ing its urgent concern for enforcing contractual choice of forum
"in an era when all courts are overloaded 120 and by using the
contractual choice of forum issue to inflate the importance of the
whole Arbitration Act in an international context, the Court cre-
ated a precedent upon which it could rely to expand the reach
and power of the Act in both international and domestic con-
texts. As in Bremen, the Supreme Court had found a means to
relieve court congestion through the interpretation of laws, one
of the few means available to it under a Constitution that grants
the power to define court jurisdiction to another branch of
government.121
c. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury
Construction Corp.
In the Scherk decision and prior cases, the Supreme Court
used relatively restrained language to describe the policies un-
derlying the Arbitration Act. Even though the result in Scherk
was to give precedence to arbitration policy over investor protec-
tion in the international context, it was the international nature
of the contractual commitment, rather than its status as an
agreement to arbitrate, that provided the basis for its decision.
In 1983 the Supreme Court's rhetoric caught up with-and
surpassed-the substance of its arbitration policy in Moses H.
Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp.12 2 In
this case the issue was whether a district court had improperly
stayed a federal lawsuit brought under section 4 of the Arbitra-
tion Act for an order compelling arbitration. The district court
had held that the Arbitration Act suit should be stayed on fed-
120 The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 12 (1972).
121 US. CONST., art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (giving Congress the power to define the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court).
12 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
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eralism grounds pending resolution of a previously filed lawsuit
in state court between the same parties dealing with the con-
tract that included the arbitration clause. In deciding the stay
was improper, the Court examined factors to determine the pro-
priety or impropriety of enjoining federal court actions. One of
those factors was whether federal law-in this case the Arbitra-
tion Act-provided the rule of decision in the federal case.
Noting that "the presence of federal-law issues must always
be a major consideration weighing against surrender" of federal
court jurisdiction to state courts,' 21 the Court emphasized the
importance of the federal-law issues involved in the Arbitration
Act.
Section 2 is a congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy
favoring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state substan-
tive or procedural policies to the contrary. The effect of the section is
to create a body of federal substantive law of arbitrability, applicable
to any arbitration agreement within the coverage of the Act .... Al-
though our holding in Prima Paint extended only to the specific issue
presented, the Court of Appeals has since consistently concluded that
questions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard for
the federal policy favoring arbitration. We agree. The Arbitration Act
establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the
scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration,
whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract lan-
guage itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to
arbitrability.'
2'
Of course, since the scope and interpretation of the Arbitra-
tion Act were not in question in the case, this language was
purely dicta. Yet the dicta provided the highest judicial sanction
for a sweeping new doctrine to be followed by lower federal
courts in Arbitration Act cases. In declaring the existence of "a
liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements, ''"2 the
Court implicitly adopted the position of the Second Circuit in
Robert Lawrence.126 The Moses H. Cone majority stated that
the effect of the Act was "to create a body of federal substantive
law of arbitrability .... ,,,127 notwithstanding the silence of the
123 Id. at 26.
.2 Id. at 24-25 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
1:25 Id. at 24.
126 271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1959); see supra notes 56-65 and accompanying text.
27 460 U.S. at 24.
[Vol. 58: 279
PRESUMPTION OF ARBITRABILITY
majority in Prima Paint and every other prior Supreme Court
decision on that point.
In Moses H. Cone the Supreme Court transplanted the pre-
sumption in favor of arbitrability from the collective bargaining
agreement context to the commercial arbitration context. This
transplant reflected the fundamental way in which the Supreme
Court's application of the Arbitration Act had changed since
Warrior & Gulf. Yet the Court offered no rationale for its infla-
tion of the Arbitration Act beyond its naked assertion that "a
liberal federal policy" underlay it. Since neither federal labor
policy nor international commerce was involved in Moses H.
Cone, the Court's own prior doctrine did not support an expan-
sive reading of the Act in the domestic commercial context. Nor
did the Court look to the Act's legislative history to determine
whether legislative intent supported its expansive reading of the
Act.128 Nevertheless, the Court's unexamined dicta in Moses H.
Cone transformed Arbitration Act jurisprudence. After Moses H.
Cone, federal courts were required to weigh issues of arbi-
trability with a heavy presumption favoring arbitration.
d. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc.
The consequences of the Court's inflation of the Arbitration
Act have been easy to see in the decade following Moses H.
Cone. A series of Supreme Court decisions have taken the Arbi-
tration Act far beyond the limit of what the 1925 Congress could
have possibly intended.
A particularly result-oriented, even startling, decision came
in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc.
129
In this case an automobile dealer in Puerto Rico brought an an-
titrust suit against three foreign corporations, one of which was
owned by an American company. The dealer alleged that the de-
12 The Court's subsequent decision in Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1937), raises
the question of whether Justice Marshall, who was the author of the Court's decisions in
both Perry and Moses H. Cone, may have had second thoughts about the breadth of the
language he used in the earlier decision to describe the Arbitration Act. The strong lan-
guage employed in Moses H. Cone established that the grounds for a stay in favor of a
state court action were not met in that case, due in part to the prevalence of federal law
issues in an Arbitration Act section 4 proceeding. In Perry, however, the Court felt it
necessary to point out that situations remain in which state law, rather than federal,
provides the rule of decision in Arbitration Act cases. 482 U.S. at 492-93 n.9.
129 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
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fendants had conspired to violate antitrust laws by preventing it
from reselling automobiles. At issue was whether an arbitration
clause contained in the dealer's agreement with two of the de-
fendants should be interpreted to bar litigation of the antitrust-
claims. The district court and the court of appeals had followed
a unanimous line of authority in other circuits to hold that the
antitrust questions were not arbitrable because of the central
role played by antitrust laws in protecting the economy of the
United States.130 The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding
that antitrust claims which have international implications are
arbitrable under the Arbitration Act.
In arriving at its decision, the Mitsubishi Motors Court first
adverted to the concern for international comity and the devel-
opment of international commerce that was voiced in Scherk
and Bremen:
The Bremen and Scherk establish a strong presumption in favor of
enforcement of freely negotiated contractual choice-of-forum provi-
sions. Here, as in Scherk, that presumption is reinforced by the em-
phatic federal policy in favor of arbitral dispute resolution. And at
least since this Nation's accession in 1970 to the Convention, see
[1970] 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. 6997, and the implementation of the
Convention in the same year by an amendment to the Federal Arbi-
tration Act, that federal policy applies with special force in the field of
international commerce.
131
The Court discounted the concern of lower courts about
"the strong possibility that contracts which generate antitrust
disputes may be contracts of adhesion, a concern which militates
against automatic forum determination by contract. ' 13 2 The
Mitsubishi Motors Court noted that a party resisting arbitration
always has the option to attack the validity of the agreement to
arbitrate or to show that one of the factors exists which would
warrant setting aside the forum-selection clause at common law.
No such showing had been attempted by the plaintiff in this
o Id. at 651, 655-57 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
231 Id. at 631 (footnote omitted). Neither the text of the enabling act, Act of July 31,
1970, Pub. L. No. 91-368, 84 Stat. 692 (1970), nor its legislative history provide any sup-
port for the Supreme Court's assertion that the policies of the Arbitration Act are to
apply "with special force in the field of international commerce."
"2 Id. at 632, quoting Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 723 F. 2d 155,
162 (1st Cir. 1983).
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case. 33 The Court conceded that antitrust issues are sometimes
complex, but "decline[d] to indulge the presumption that the
parties and arbitral body conducting a proceeding will be unable
or unwilling to retain competent, conscientious, and impartial
arbitrators" capable of resolving an antitrust claim.1
Finally, the Court came to the nub of the matter, raised by
the court of appeals, that "a claim under the antitrust laws is
not merely a private matter. The Sherman Act is designed to
promote the national interest in a competitive economy; thus,
the plaintiff asserting his rights under the Act has been likened
to a private attorney-general who protects the public's inter-
est. ' 13 5 Although the Court conceded that the treble-damages
provision is a "crucial deterrent to potential violators," it saw no
reason why the provision could not be enforced in arbitration. 36
The Court reasoned further that considerations of international
comity required the reference of antitrust issues to international
arbitral tribunals even when the Act would not require reference
of identical issues to domestic arbitration. 137 Accordingly, the
Court reversed the holding of the court of appeals with respect
to the arbitrability of antitrust issues and remanded the case.13 8
The majority in Mitsubishi Motors cited the Convention in
finding that federal policy favoring arbitration applies with spe-
cial force in international commerce. 3 9 However, the Court pro-
ceeded almost to the conclusion of its opinion without further
reference to the Convention. In the final footnote of the opinion
the Court finally addressed the language in the Convention that
limits its application to "subject matter capable of settlement by
arbitration" and contemplates exceptions to arbitrability
grounded in domestic law. Since Congress did not expressly
specify any matters it intended to exclude from the scope of the
Convention, the Court declined to impose a judicially-implied
exception to arbitrability for antitrust decisions.
1 40
'33 Id. at 632-33.
234 Id. at 634.
"I Id. at 635, quoting Mitsubishi Motors, 723 F.2d at 168, quoting American Safety
Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 392 F.2d 821, 826 (2d Cir. 1988).
236 Id. at 635-36.
137 Id. at 629.
238 Id. at 640.
13 Id. at 631.
140 Id. at 639 n.21.
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Justices Marshall and Brennan joined Justice Stevens in a
spirited dissent to the Mitsubishi Motors decision. In his dissent
Justice Stevens expressed surprise that the Court had failed "to
determine the specific commitments that the U.S. has made to
enforce private commitments to arbitrate disputes arising under
public law" before relying on its own vague notions as to what
international comity requires."' The Convention, as analyzed by
Justice Stevens, clearly contemplates that signatory nations will
enforce domestic laws that prohibit arbitration with respect to
certain subject matters.142 This understanding had been part of
the explanation offered by the President in presenting the Con-
vention to the Senate for its advice and consent.1 43 Stevens' dis-
sent noted that it was "clear ... that the international obliga-
tions of the United States permit us to honor Congress'
commitment to the exclusive resolution of antitrust disputes in
the federal courts."144 The executive branch, in its brief to the
Court as amicus curiae, informed it that the "United States' de-
termination that federal antitrust claims are non-arbitrable
under the Convention... is not likely to result in either surprise
or recrimination on the part of other signatories to the Conven-
tion."'14 5 Stevens felt that the majority had been led to "folly" by
their internationalist vision.
46
e. Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon
Two years later in Shearson/American Express Inc. v. Mc-
Mahon147 the Court partially abandoned the distinction between
domestic and international concerns that had seemed so impor-
tant in the Scherk and Mitsubishi Motors decisions.14 8 In Shear-
son/American Express retail customers of a securities brokerage
141 Id. at 658 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
142 Id.
143 Id. at 660, quoting S. Exec. Doc. E, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. at 19 (1968) ("The
requirement that the agreement apply to a matter capable of settlement by arbitration is
necessary in order to take proper account of laws in force in many countries which pro-
hibit the submission of certain questions to arbitration. In some States of the United
States, for example, disputes affecting the title to real property are not arbitrable.").
144 Id.
141 Id. at 661, quoting Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 30.
141 Id. at 665 & n.41.
14? 482 U.S. 220, reh'g denied, 483 U.S. 1056 (1987).
'4 This development was foreshadowed by the Court's dicta concerning the Act in
Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983); see supra notes 122-28 and accompanying text.
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firm filed suit in federal district court alleging violations of the
anti-fraud provisions of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 of the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934 and RICO violations. The plain-
tiffs' Exchange Act claims were similar to the ones made by the
plaintiff in Scherk.149 They argued that the international com-
plications relied upon in Scherk were not present in their case.
Accordingly, their Exchange Act remedy should have been as
nonarbitrable as the 1933 Act remedy that was held to be nonar-
bitrable in Wilko.
In ruling that the plaintiffs' Exchange Act claims were arbi-
trable under the Arbitration Act, the Shearson Court noted that
Wilko had been undermined by more recent decisions.2 The
Court also noted that the regulatory structure of the securities
laws had changed since the time of Wilko.
In 1953, when Wilko was decided, the [Securities and Exchange]
Commission had only limited authority over the rules governing self-
regulatory organizations (SROs)-the national securities exchanges
and registered securities associations-and this authority appears not
to have included any authority at all over their arbitration rules. Since
the 1975 amendments to § 19 of the Exchange Act, however, the Com-
mission has had expansive power to ensure the adequacy of the arbi-
tration procedures employed by the SRMs. 1'
Accordingly, the Supreme Court ruled that claims under
section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act are arbitrable,
whether they occur in the domestic or international context.
15 2
149 417 U.S. 506, rehg denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974); see supra notes 103-121 and
accompanying text.
150 Indeed, most of the reasons given in Wilho have been rejected subsequently
by the Court as a basis for holding claims to be non.arbitrable. In Mitsubishi,
for example, we recognized that arbitral tribunals are readily capable of han-
dling the factual and legal complexities of antitrust claims, notwithstanding
the absence of judicial instruction and supervision .... Likewise, we have
concluded that the streamlined procedures of arbitration do not entail any
consequential restriction on substantive rights .... Finally, we have indicated
that there is no reason to assume at the outset that arbitrators will not follow
the law;, although judicial scrutiny of arbitration awards necessarily is limited,
such review is sufficient to ensure that arbitrators comply with the require-
ments of the statute.
482 U.S. 220, 232 (1987) (citations omitted).
5 Id. at 233 (citation omitted).
162 Id. at 238. The Court disposed quickly of the plaintiff's argument that RICO
claims were nonarbitrable. Applying its reasoning from Mitsubishi Motors, the Court
found that there was no greater reason to exclude the treble damages claims of private
parties under RICO from the ambit of the Arbitration Act than there was to exclude
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In dissent Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan
and Marshall, noted that the Court had given an unduly narrow
reading to Wilko. Blackmun reasoned that "the Scherk decision
turned on the special nature of agreements to arbitrate in the
international commercial context" 153 and therefore provided no
significant support for the decision in ShearsonlAmerican Ex-
press. Finally, Blackmun observed that "several aspects of arbi-
tration that were seen by the Wilko Court to be inimical to the
policy of investor protection still remain." 154 For example, judi-
cial review of arbitrators' interpretations of securities laws was
still difficult because arbitrators are neither required to give rea-
sons for their decisions nor to record their proceedings. The ba-
ses for vacating an arbitration award were limited and the arbi-
trators' interpretation of the law was subject to review only
under the "manifest disregard" standard.1 55
Furthermore, there remains the danger that, at worst, compelling an
investor to arbitrate securities claims puts him in a forum controlled
by the securities industry .... The Uniform Code provides some safe-
guards but despite them, and indeed because of the background of the
arbitrators, the investor has the impression, frequently justified, that
his claims are being judged by a forum composed of individuals sym-
pathetic to the securities industry and not drawn from the public. It is
generally recognized that the codes do not define who falls into the
category "not from the securities industry". Accordingly, it is often
possible for the "public" arbitrators to be attorneys or consultants
whose clients have been exchange members or SROs. The uniform op-
position of investors to compelled arbitration and the overwhelming
support of the securities industry for the process suggest that there
must be some truth to the investors' belief that the securities industry
has an advantage in a forum under its own control. 188
treble damages under the Clayton Act. Id.
'8s Id. at 255 (Blackmun, J. dissenting) (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
'u Id. at 257.
Id. at 258. The Supreme Court noted in Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436 (1953),
that arbitrators "manifest disregard" of the law governing a contract might subject an
arbitral award to judicial review for error in interpretation, presumably under 9 U.S.C. §
10. However, this standard "presupposes something beyond and different from a mere
error in the law or failure on the part of the arbitrators to understand or apply the law."
Saxis v. Steamship Co. v. Mulitifacs Int'l Traders, Inc., 375 F.2d 577, 582 (2d Cir. 1967).
1"I Id. at 260-61. See William Glaberson, When the Investor Has a Gripe, N.Y.
TimSs, Mar. 29, 1987, at 8 (statement of Sheldon H. Elsen, Chairman, ABA Task Force
on Securities Arbitration: "The houses basically like the present systeni because they
own the stacked deck.") (emphasis in original) (citations and footnotes omitted).
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McMahon showed that a majority of the Court no longer
found the Wilko rationale persuasive. Not surprisingly the 1988
Court explicitly overruled Wilko in Rodriquez de Quijas v.
Shearson-American Express,157 holding that predispute arbitra-
tion agreements are enforceable for claims arising under the Se-
curities Act of 1933.-15 The resulting state of the law after Rodri-
quez de Quijas was a world apart from the expectations of the
1925 Congress. The congressional Committee Chairman who was
assured in 1924 that there could be no problem with contracts of
adhesion against small shippers would, in the Supreme Court's
new world, witness contracts of adhesion that would be routinely
enforced against small investors. Concerned about maintaining
the right to a jury trial, he would be faced with antitrust viola-
tors against whom there could be no right to any kind of trial.
Informed that the Act would not encroach upon the laws of the
states, 159 he would see important policies of states struck down
because they infringed upon the paramount contractual right to
arbitration. In short, he would have seen his expectations be-
trayed by a Court that decided that the statute's incidental ben-
efit-judicial economy-justified an expanded application of the
Act that altered its basic character.
H. THE THRELKELD CASE
The doctrines announced by the Supreme Court in its arbi-
tration cases have affected many litigants who come to court to
vindicate their rights. A close look at one of those lawsuits,
David L. Threlkeld & Co. v. Meta lgesellschaft Ltd., °00 provides
some insight into the effects of the Supreme Court arbitration
doctrine.
A. Facts
In Threlkeld the plaintiff was a closely-held Vermont corpo-
157 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
158 The Supreme Court has also recently imposed Arbitration Act requirements
upon claims made under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. Gilmer v. Inter-
state/Johnson Lane Corp., 111 S. Ct. 1647 (1991).
19 1924 Joint Hearings, supra note 3, at 38 ("So far as the present law declares
simply the policy of recognizing and enforcing arbitration agreements in the Federal
Courts it does not encroach upon the province of the individual states.").
n. 923 F.2d 245 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 112 S. Ct. 17 (1991).
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ration, incorporated in 1985, that traded in forward and futures
contracts for metals through the London Metal Exchange
("LME") and the New York COMEX Exchange.161 In June 1986
Threlkeld & Co. engaged the commodities brokerage services of
Metallgesellschaft Limited (London) ("MG").162 MG, brokered
or entered into commodities contracts on behalf of Threlkeld &
Co. and made margin financing available for Threlkeld & Co.'s
contracts.16 3
The contracts traded by Threlkeld & Co. (futures contracts
on the COMEX and forward contracts on the LME) involved
promises to accept or deliver fixed quantities of metal for a price
certain at a fixed date in the future. 64 Threlkeld & Co. was the
principal for its trades made on the COMEX, but only "clearing
members," such as MG, could enter into contracts as principals
on the LME. Accordingly, for LME transactions, MG entered
into contracts on behalf of Threlkeld & Co."6 5
As Threlkeld & Co. explained in its pleadings, it is essential
for a trader in commodity contracts to have an accurate under-
standing of the value of its forward positions at all times:
The market value of futures and forward contracts fluctuates on a
daily basis. Certain contracts have no published value. A trader's abil-
ity to earn profits depends on his ability to predict market trends and
enter into contracts which reflect his predictions, while at the same
time limiting risks. Good trading necessarily entails an elaborate sys-
tem of "hedges," or buying and selling against established positions to
limit risk.'
A significant portion of Threlkeld & Co.'s contracts were
made on "margin." In a margin transaction, the party taking the
transaction risk pays at the time of the making of the contract a
certain amount of money, which represents a portion of the risk
that the party has undertaken in the contract. The remainder of
the value of that risk or "margin" may be financed by another
"I Complaint at 1-2, 1-7, David L. Threlkeld & Co., Inc. v. Metallgesellschaft
Ltd. (Orange Cty. Supr. Ct., Vt., 1989) (No. S189-89), reprinted in Joint Appendix, at
A3, David L. Threlkeld & Co. v. Metallgesellschaft Ltd., 923 F. 2d 245 (2d Cir. 1991)
(No. 90-7480) [hereinafter Joint Appendix].
.62 Plaintiff's memorandum in opposition to motion to dismiss or stay proceedings
at 4, reprinted in Joint Appendix, supra note 161, at A166-69.
163 Id.
"I Id. at 3, reprinted in Joint Appendix, supra note 161, at A168.
161 Id. at 4, reprinted in Joint Appendix, supra note 161, at A169 n.3.
166 Id., reprinted in Joint Appendix, supra note 161, at A169.
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party. 6 7 In the case of Threlkeld & Co.'s transactions on the
LME and COMEX, its margin was financed by MG.
To protect the broker and other parties in transactions, ex-
changes and brokerage firms have internal rules requiring that
margins be secured by collateral or by money paid into a margin
account. The margin for each commodity fluctuates as the mar-
ket price for the commodity changes. From time to time brokers
and exchanges are required to make "margin calls," which re-
quire the parties to commodities contracts to put up additional
collateral to secure the margin on the risks they have taken.
When a contract involves a large amount of a commodity, the
margin call on that contract can also involve a great deal of
money. One of the goals traders hope to achieve by monitoring
their accounts is to minimize their vulnerability to large or unex-
pected margin calls.
MG provided Threlkeld & Co. with frequent statements
evaluating Threlkeld & Co.'s trading positions. From MG's point
of view, this statement provided it with a means of monitoring
whether Threlkeld & Co. had posted an adequate amount of
margin or other collateral as security for its contracts with MG.
MG's "Terms of Business," a written document signed on behalf
of Thrdlkeld & Co., indicated that all price quotations given to
Threlkeld & Co. might be subject to errors and contained an ac-
knowledgement from Threlkeld & Co. that reliance upon such
information was at Threlkeld & Co.'s own risk."0 8
Threlkeld & Co.'s trading relations with MG apparently
went forward without notable dispute until 1989, when a series
of occurrences led to a fiasco. The facts themselves are disputed.
According to Threlkeld & Co.'s version of the facts,"' it became
1-7 See Stephens v. Reynolds Securities, 413 F. Supp. 50 (N.D. Ala.), aoffd, 523 F.2d
1053 (5th Cir. 1976) ("A margin account is the securities industry's method of extending
credit to customers; a customer may purchase a specified amount of stock from a securi-
ties firm by advancing only a portion of the purchase price. The firm maintains the stock
purchased as collateral for the 'loan' and charges interest on the balance of the purchase
price remaining to be paid.").
1" Terms of Business, Sept. 14, 1988, at 2, reprinted in Joint Appendix, supra note
161, at A157-58.
189 Since the Second Circuit ultimately reversed the district court's refusal to issue
an order of arbitration against the plaintiff, it is appropriate to focus on the plaintiff's
rendition of the facts, since it was those facts that were held to be insufficient to resist
arbitration. Robert Lawrence Co., Inc. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402, 404 (2d
Cir. 1959) (court must accept non-moving party's version of facts in motion to compel
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aware in early 1989 that its internal systems for evaluating its
positions could no longer cope with its trading volume. Threl-
keld & Co. claimed to have explained its difficulty to MG and to
have received MG's assurance that the valuations Threlkeld &
Co. received from MG were accurate and that Threlkeld & Co.
should rely upon them.
17 0
In February 1989 MG informed Threlkeld & Co. that MG
could no longer place Threlkeld & Co.'s trades on COMEX be-
cause MG had not registered with the Commodities Futures
Trading Commission. At that point, Threlkeld & Co. owned ap-
proximately $9 million in copper, which it had acquired through
contracts placed by MG on the COMEX. MG's disqualification
from trading on COMEX was extremely inconvenient for Threl-
keld & Co. because it meant that Threlkeld & Co.'s copper ac-
counts would either have to be liquidated or transferred. To fur-
ther complicate matters, Threlkeld & Co.'s positions with MG
on the COMEX and on the LME had been purchased on margin
and were cross-collateralized.17 ' The transfer of its COMEX con-
tracts to another broker threatened to reduce the collateral
available to MG for Threlkeld & Co.'s contracts on the LME
and to deprive Threlkeld & Co. of the collateral (the LME con-'
tracts) upon which it had been relying to collateralize its margin
financing obligations under the COMEX contracts. To sort out
these difficulties, MG agreed to lend Threlkeld & Co. the
amounts necessary to satisfy the margin requirements of Threl-
keld & Co.'s new COMEX broker, provided Threlkeld & Co.
pledged collateral for the margin loans. 7 ' Although MG trans-
ferred Threlkeld & Co.'s COMEX copper contracts to Threlkeld
& Co.'s new broker, MG continued to hold warehouse receipts
for the copper that it had acquired on COMEX on behalf of
Threlkeld & Co.
For its own internal bookkeeping purposes, MG stopped re-
arbitration under 9 U.S.C. § 3). The author and publisher have relied upon the pleadings
submitted by the parties in preparing this account of the litigation. The author and pub-
lisher have no independent knowledge of the facts underlying the litigation and the
reader is advised that the allegations repeated herein concerning the parties to the litiga-
tion may not be true.
170 MG denied making any such assurances to Threlkeld & Co.
"' Plaintiff's District Court Memorandum at 7, David L. Threlkeld & Co. v.





ferring to the copper as "COMEX" copper and began referring
to it as "London standard copper." Copper was a commodity
that had been traded at one point on the LME, but that had
recently been discontinued. According to the LME's rules, the
price to be used in valuing a commodity for margin purposes
was the "Closing Price most recently quoted. 17 3 In providing its
valuation reports to Threlkeld & Co., MG began to use the last
price quoted on the LME before its discontinuation of trading in
copper contracts as a basis for its copper quotation. Although
the actual market price for copper fluctuated, the price used by
MG to reflect that price did not change. As a consequence, MG's
evaluation of Threlkeld & Co.'s copper positions became increas-
ingly inaccurate.
The problem was further compounded in May 1989, accord-
ing to Threlkeld & Co.'s complaint.1 74 At that time Threlkeld &
Co. informed MG that it had lost its internal accountant and, as
a consequence, would need to rely on MG's valuations for trad-
ing and for internal accounting purposes if it was to continue
trading. MG assured Threlkeld & Co. that MG's valuations were
accurate and that it could and should rely on them in continuing
to trade through MG.
176
In July 1989 Threlkeld & Co. informed MG that it intended
to dispose of the copper that MG held on its behalf. Stirred to
action by this news, MG discovered that it had seriously mis-
valued Threlkeld & Co.'s copper positions. On August 2, 1989
MG reported a $5 million loss on Threlkeld & Co.'s copper posi-
tions and issued a margin call for approximately $1.7 million,
even though it had reported a $3.4 million positive margin on
the contracts during the final days of July.7 Perhaps surprised
by the sudden large margin call on copper, Threlkeld & Co. con-
ducted an internal investigation with respect to its other metals
positions. Shortly thereafter Threlkeld & Co. informed MG that
it appeared that MG had also overvalued Threlkeld & Co.'s alu-
minum contracts by millions of dollars. In September 1989 MG
revalued those aluminum contracts and increased its margin call
17- London Metal Exchange Rules and Regulations ("LME Rules") at 1-6 (definition
of "variation margin"), reprinted in Joint Appendix, supra note 161, at A59.
7' Complaint at 4, 16, reprinted in Joint Appendix, supra note 161, at A6.
175 Id.
176 Plaintiff's District Court Memorandum at 9-10, reprinted in Joint Appendix,
supra note 161, at A174-75.
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to Threlkeld & Co. by approximately $4.9 million. Threlkeld &
Co. and MG negotiated for several months about who should
bear any loss resulting from the misvaluation of the metals con-
tracts.177 Failing to reach agreement, Threlkeld & Co. filed suit
against MG in December 1989 in Vermont state court. Threlkeld
& Co. alleged that MG's assurances concerning the accuracy of
their valuations constituted an oral valuation contract, which
MG had breached. Threlkeld & Co. also alleged negligence on
the part of MG in preparing valuations for use by Threlkeld &
Co. 178 In January 1990 MG sent a notice to Threlkeld & Co. in-
forming them of its commencement of arbitration proceedings
under rules of the LME. MG then removed Threlkeld & Co.'s
suit to federal court, filed an answer asserting counterclaims for
$10 million in margin allegedly due to MG and moved for an
order compelling arbitration of the disputes between the parties
and dismissal or a stay of the federal court litigation in favor of
arbitration.
17 9
MG's motion claimed that Threlkeld & Co. had consented
to arbitration in two ways. First, MG claimed that Threlkeld &
Co. had expressly agreed to arbitration in a written preliminary
agreement which Threlkeld & Co. had signed at the start of its
relationship with MG.180 Second, MG alleged that Threlkeld &
Co. had agreed to be bound by the rules and regulations of the
LME and that those rules required arbitration of the dispute.
The preliminary agreement was dated February 3, 1987,
when David L. Threlkeld and a member of MG signed a "Memo
to File," which was entitled "outline of basic suggestion made by
Mike Hutchinson of M.G. Ltd." 8 ' The Memo to File contained
eleven points. Point ten stated: "This is a memorandum of un-
derstanding only upon which a more formalized agreement will
be based." Point eleven stated: "The final agreement will be
subject to arbitration and subject to the laws of England."1 82
The parties subsequently agreed that they had no need to enter
177 Statement of John M. Quitmeyer, Hearing Transcript at 5, reprinted in Joint
Appendix, supra note 161, at A204.
', Complaint at U 30-36, reprinted in Joint Appendix, supra note 161, at A7-9.
Docket, Civ. No. 90-28, reprinted in Joint Appendix, supra note 161, at Al;
Answer and Counterclaim, reprinted in Joint Appendix, supra note 161, at A14.





into a more formal written agreement.183
The rules of the LME also provided for arbitration of dis-
putes. Regulation 10.1 of the LME Contract Regulations (found
in part 4 of the LME Rules) stated that "any dispute as to the
existence, completion or validity of or arising out of any Con-
tract shall be referred to arbitration in accordance with the
Rules.18 4 In addition, section 1.1 of the "Arbitration Rules" of
the LME (found in part 8 of the LME Rules) stated that:
All disputes arising out of or in relation to any contract which con-
tains an agreement to refer disputes to arbitration in accordance with
the Rules and Regulations of the London Metal Exchange, or the exis-
tence, completion, or validity of such contract, shall be referred to
arbitration. 85
MG argued that Threlkeld & Co. was required to arbitrate
its dispute with MG because Threlkeld & Co. had agreed to be
bound by the LME rules. MG claimed that Threlkeld & Co. had
agreed to abide by the rules in a series of documents that had
passed between the parties in the course of their transactions.
One of those documents was a standard form MG document en-
titled "Terms of Business."' 8 Section 11 of that document, enti-
tled "Margin," stated, in relevant part, that "[a]ny margin held
by us will be held subject to these Terms and to the applicable
rules of the relevant Exchange, Exchange Organization or Mar-
ket. ' 187 MG argued that this language gave it authorization to
arbitrate the margin call and all related issues with Threlkeld &
Co. in the forum provided by the LME Rules. MG also put into
evidence a written confirmation of some of its metals contracts
with Threlkeld & Co. that was signed on behalf of Threlkeld &
Co. That confirmation said, in part, that contracts identified in
the confirmation "have been made subject to the current rules
and regulations of the London Metals Exchange."188
18 Opinion and Order at 12, reprinted in Joint Appendix, supra note 161, at A248.
184 LME Rules, part 4, reg. 10.1, at 4-5, reprinted in Joint Appendix, supra note
161, at A84. The term "Contract" is defined in the LME Rules as "a contract for metals
in a form prescribed by and subject to the Rules of the [LME]." LME Rules, part 1, at
1-2, reprinted in Joint Appendix, supra note 161, at A55.
185 LME Rules, part 8, rule 1.1 at 8-1, reprinted in Joint Appendix, supra note 161,
at A101.
186 Reprinted in Joint Appendix, supra note 161, at A191.
18 Reprinted in Joint Appendix, supra note 161, at A194.
188 MG Confirmation, reprinted in Joint Appendix, supra note 161, at A185.
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B. The District Court Opinion
After briefs were filed, affidavits and exhibits submitted,
and oral arguments heard, District Judge Albert W. Coffrin of
the United States District Court for Vermont decided the issue
of arbitrability against MG and denied MG's motion for dismis-
sal or for stay pending arbitration.'89 At the outset Judge Coffrin
exercised his discretion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) to treat MG's motion to dismiss as a motion for sum-
mary judgment.' Applying the summary judgment standards
found in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), Judge Coffrin
ruled that MG could not prevail on its motion unless the materi-
als before the court "show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law."'19 According to this standard, the
court had to "resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable in-
fluences in favor of Threlkeld & Co."'19 2 Thus Judge Coffrin
ruled that "for MG to prevail, it must demonstrate that no ma-
terial issue of fact exists and that the undisputed facts indicate
[Threlkeld & Co.'s] claims are subject to arbitration.' 9 3
Judge Coffrin addressed MG's argument that the Memo to
File obligated Threlkeld & Co. to arbitrate its dispute arising
out of its alleged oral valuation agreement. 4 Judge Coffrin
"' David L. Threlkeld & Co., Inc. v. Metallgesellschaft Ltd., No. 90-28, slip op. (D.
Vt. April 30, 1990), reprinted in Joint Appendix, supra note 161, at A237.
190 Id. at 6, reprinted in Joint Appendix, supra note 161, at A242. See FED. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(6).
191 FED. R. Civ. P. 56.
192 Threlkeld, slip op. at 7 (quoting Heyman v. Commerce & Industry Ins. Co., 524
F. 2d 1317, 1320 (2d Cir. 1975)), reprinted in Joint Appendix, supra note 161, at A243.
19 Id. at 7-8, reprinted in Joint Appendix, supra note 161, at A243-44.
194 Judge Coffrin first examined MG's argument that Threlkeld & Co.'s alleged oral
agreement was barred, as a matter of law, by the parol evidence rule and the Terms of
Business. As stated above, the Terms of Business stated that MG's valuations "may be
subject to change or errors" and that "reliance upon such information is at your own
risk." The Terms of Business also stated that MG would "provide such additional ser-
vices as may be agreed from time to time and confirmed in writing." Threlkeld, slip op.
at 8-9, reprinted in Joint Appendix, supra note 161, at A244-45. MG argued that the
contract's reference to written amendments precluded the possibility of an oral amend-
ment. However, Judge Coffrin ruled that an oral agreement modifying the Terms of Bus-
iness could have been independently enforceable, regardless of any writing requirements
in the Terms of Business, because Threlkeld's agreement to continue doing business with
MG could have constituted a new consideration to bind MG to the modification of the




noted that correspondence between the parties subsequent to
the Memo to File had mutually waived the obligation of entering
into a more formalized agreement between MG and Threlkeld &
Co. The subsequent correspondence did not specifically mention
arbitration. The court found that, on its face, it was unclear
whether the Memo to File's reference to arbitration was meant
to apply after the parties had waived the requirement of a later,
more formalized agreement. Construing the ambiguity against
MG, Judge Coffrin ruled that "there is a reasonable basis for a
difference of opinion as to the scope of the Memo to File's arbi-
tration clause."195 Accordingly, Judge Coffrin held that the refer-
ence to arbitration in the Memo to File did not provide a suffi-
cient basis to compel arbitration.
Next, Judge Coffrin addressed MG's argument that Threl-
keld & Co. had obligated itself to obey the LME rules by agree-
ing to MG's Terms of Business. Observing that the section gov-
erning margin made it subject to the rules of the "relevant
Exchange" and that similar language appeared on the metals
contract confirmations, Judge Coffrin interpreted the arbitration
clause in regulation 10.1 narrowly.96 He noted that regulation
10.1 was limited to "any dispute as to the existence, completion
or validity of or arising out of any Contract" and that the term
"Contract" was defined elsewhere in the LME Rules as "a con-
tract for metals in a form prescribed by and subject to the Rules
"1197of the Exchange ....
Reading regulation 10.1 and the Terms of Business in the
manner most favorable to the party opposing the motion, Judge
Coffrin interpreted them to require only arbitration of "any dis-
pute arising out of a margin contract for metals traded on the
LME entered into by Threlkeld & Co. and MG."'1 8 The court
went on to find that arbitration should not be ordered if Threl-
keld & Co.'s claim to have entered into an oral modification of
Id. at 13-14, reprinted in Joint Appendix, supra note 161, at A249-50.
The district court did not consider whether section 1.1 of the Arbitration Rules
required arbitration of the dispute. See Transcript of Hearing before the Honorable Al-
bert W. Coifrin on April 27, 1990, Civ. No. 90-28, at 7, reprinted in Joint Appendix,
supra note 161, at A200-06. It appears that MG did not rely heavily upon that provision
before the court. See Brief for Appellee, at 11 n.7, David L. Threlkeld & Co. v.
Metallgesellschaft Ltd., 923 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1991).
197 Threlkeld, slip op. at 14-15, reprinted in Joint Appendix, supra note 161, at
A2M50-51.
111 Id. at 18, reprinted in Joint Appendix, supra note 161, at A254.
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the Terms of Business alleged the existence of a "collateral"
agreement. Because MG's obligations under its alleged oral
agreement could, on Threlkeld & Co.'s view of the facts, have
been independent of the obligations contained in the Terms of
Business or LME Rules, Judge Coffrin declined to rule that the
oral agreement was not a "collateral" agreement. Judge Coffrin
found that "a reasonable basis for a difference of opinion as to
the applicability of the LME Rules' arbitration clause [to the
alleged oral valuation agreement] exists, rendering summary
judgment inappropriate." 1 9 He denied MG's motion to dismiss
or to stay the district court action and to compel arbitration.200
MG appealed the district court decision to a Second Circuit
panel consisting of Circuit Judges Lumbard, Kearse and
McLaughlin.201
C. The Second Circuit Decision
In a unanimous opinion authored by Second Circuit Judge
McLaughlin, the court reversed and remanded the case, di-
recting the lower court to order arbitration in accordance with
LME Rules.202
The Second Circuit began its analysis of the case by laying
out the Supreme Court rules for consideration of arbitrability
disputes. Citing Rodriguez De Quijas,20 3 Moses H. Cone,204 Mit-
subishi Motors Corp.2 °5 and Scherk,0 8 the court declared that
federal policy strongly favors arbitration as an alternative dispute res-
olution process .... [Flederal arbitration policy requires that "any
doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in
favor of arbitration."
'" Id. at 15, reprinted in Joint Appendix, supra note 161, at A251.
200 Id. at 18, reprinted in Joint Appendix, supra note 161, at A254.
21 The Second Circuit Panel found jurisdiction over the interlocutory appeal under
9 U.S.C. § 15 (1988). See David L. Threlkeld & Co., Inc. v. Metallgesellschaft Ltd., 923
F.2d 245, 246 (2d Cir. 1991).
202 Id. at 252-53.
203 Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
204 Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983); see
supra notes 122-28 and accompanying text.
205 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985);
see supra notes 129-46 and accompanying text.
.o Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, reh'g denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974); see
supra notes 108-21 and accompanying text.
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The policy in favor of arbitration is even stronger in the context of
international business transactions .... Stability in international
trading was the engine behind the Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.... This treaty-to which
the United States is a signatory-makes it clear that the liberal fed-
eral arbitration policy "applies with special force in the field of inter-
national commerce." 207
Turning to District Judge Coffrin's opinion, the Second Cir-
cuit found that Coffrin had "lost sight of th[e] presumption of
arbitrability" and erred by applying summary judgment stan-
dards to the case.20 The Second Circuit found that it was inap-
propriate for the district court to resolve all ambiguities in favor
of Threlkeld & Co. on MG's motion to compel arbitration. In the
view of the Second Circuit summary judgment standards were
unnecessary because "there was no question that an agreement
to arbitrate existed and that arbitration was refused. The dis-
trict court erred in not deciding the motion simply as one to
compel arbitration.
'20 9
Applying the standards that the panel thought appropriate
to arbitrability disputes, the Second Circuit first considered
whether the parties had entered into an agreement to arbitrate.
Threlkeld & Co. had argued on appeal that no enforceable
agreement to arbitrate existed because the arbitration rules of
the LME constituted a contract of adhesion and Vermont law
voided any obligation it might otherwise have had to arbitrate
dispute with MG.210 The LME Rules contained a provision, reg-
ulation 1.3 of the Contract Regulations, which made void any
provision of any contract that purported to exclude or was oth-
erwise in conflict with the rules and regulations of the LME.211
Since the arbitration clause relied upon by MG was one of the
rules that was non-negotiable, Threlkeld & Co. argued that it
had no power to refuse to enter into an obligation to arbitrate its
207 Threlkeld, 923 F. 2d. at 248.
203 Id.
202 Id. at 248-49.
210 Brief for Appellee at 22-25, David L. Threlkeld & Co. v. Metallgeseschaft Ltd.,
923 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1991) (No. 90-7480).
"I LME Rules, part 4, reg. 1.3, at 4-1, reprinted in Joint Appendix, supra note 161,
at A50. Regulation 1.3, part 4 of the LME Rules reads as follows "[A]ny provision of any
contract (other than a provision incorporated by virtue of the General Regulations of the
Clearing House or by virtue of the Trading Regulations) which purports to exclude or is
otherwise in conflict with these Contract Regulations shall be void." Id.
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dispute with MG.212 Thus the LME Rules presented a classic
example of a contract of adhesion, which Threlkeld & Co. ar-
gued should be unenforceable as a matter of public policy.
The Second Circuit gave little heed to Threlkeld & Co.'s
claim to be the victim of an adhesion contract. Threlkeld & Co.
was a sophisticated commodities trader with extensive experi-
ence in the field and the LME arbitration requirement was typi-
cal for commodities contracts. "Threlkeld & Co. cannot now
claim that it did not understand its rights and obligations under
the contracts. 21 3 Therefore the Court found the arbitration
clauses of the LME Rules were not contracts of adhesion.1 4
Next, the Second Circuit examined the effect of a Vermont
statute that required a special written acknowledgement of arbi-
tration to be signed by each of the parties or their representa-
tives before an arbitration agreement could be enforceable.2 10
212 Brief for Appellee at 24-25, Threlkeld, 923 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1991) (No. 90-7480).
212 923 F.2d 245, 249 (2d Cir. 1991) (citations omitted).
z Id. There is an obvious contradiction here. According to the Second Circuit the
"fatal flaw" in the district court decision was its failure to see that "there was no ques-
tion that an agreement to arbitrate existed," and therefore, the district court's use of a
summary judgment standard was inappropriate. Id. at 248-49. However, the first ques-
tion that the court of appeals examined was precisely the issue of whether an enforceable
agreement to arbitrate existed. Summary judgment standards, including the construction
of ambiguities in favor of the opponent of the motion, should have been employed by the
Second Circuit in making this determination. See infra notes 246-67 and accompanying
text. Since the only evidence adduced by Threlkeld on appeal in support of its "contract
of adhesion" claim was the existence of regulation 1.3 of part 4 of the LME Rules, the
employment of summary judgment standards might not have made a difference in the
outcome on this issue, because the burden of coming forward with sufficient evidence to
demonstrate the existence of a genuine dispute with respect to a material fact was upon
Threlkeld & Co. with respect to this affirmative defense. However, additional factual
issues could have been raised by Threlkeld & Co. that, under a summary judgment stan-
dard, might have been sufficient to require a trial of the issue under section 4 of the
Arbitration Act. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1947). See infra notes 275-99 and accompanying text.
215 The Vermont statute read as follows:
§5652. Validity of arbitration agreements.
(a) General Rule. Unless otherwise provided in the agreement, a written
agreement to submit any existing controversy to arbitration or a provi-
sion in a written contract to submit to arbitration any controversy
thereafter arising between the parties creates a duty to arbitrate, and is
valid, enforceable and irrevocable, except upon such grounds as exist for
the revocation of a contract.
(b) Required provision. No agreement to arbitrate is enforceable unless
accompanied by or containing a written acknowledgement of arbitration
signed by each of the parties or their representatives. When contained in
the same document as the agreement to arbitrate, that acknowledge-
ment shall be displayed prominently. The acknowledgement shall pro-
[Vol. 58: 279
PRESUMPTION OF ARBITRABILITY
The court held that the statute was preempted by federal law as
applied to Threlkeld & Co.'s contracts with MG.2 10 As the Su-
preme Court held in Prima Paint, the Arbitration Act applies in
federal court to diversity suits that relate to contracts involving
interstate or international commerce.217 Threlkeld's contract
with MG, which concerned the purchase and sale of commodi-
ties on an exchange in a foreign country, clearly involved inter-
national commerce. Noting that the Convention has been incor-
porated in the United States law by section 202 of the
Arbitration Act,21 8 it examined the question of whether article
11(1) of the Convention preempted the Vermont statute.21 Both
the Vermont statute220 and the Convention required. agreements
to arbitrate to be in writing. However, the standard set forth in
the Vermont statute was more demanding than that of the Con-
vention. Finding that "state statutes such as the Vermont stat-
ute . . .effectively reincarnate the former judicial hostility to-
wards arbitration" and that the Vermont statute clashed
directly with the Convention and the Act, the Second Circuit
held that the Convention and the Act preempted the Vermont
statute, making the LME arbitration provision enforceable as
drafted.22'
vide substantially as follows:
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF ARBITRATION.
I understand that (this agreement/my agreement with
of ) contains an agreement to arbitrate. After signing
(this/that) document, I understand that I will not be able to bring a lawsuit
concerning any dispute that may arise which is covered by the arbitration
agreement, unless it involves a question of constitutional or civil rights. In-
stead, I agree to submit any such dispute to an impartial arbitrator.
VT. STAT. ANN. tit 12, § 5652 (1989).
216 Threlkeld, 923 F.2d at 249.
217 388 U.S. 395 (1967); see supra notes 66-77 and accompanying text.
218 Section 202 reads, in part, as follows: "An arbitration agreement or arbitral
award arising out of a legal relationship, whether contractual or not, which is considered
as commercial, including a transaction, contract or agreement described in section 2 of
this title, falls under the Convention." 9 U.S.C. § 202 (1988).
2 9 Article 11(1) of the Convention reads: "Each Contracting State shall recognize an
agreement in writing under which the parties undertake to submit to arbitration all or
any differences which have arisen or which may arise between them in respect of a de-
fined legal relationship, whether contractual or not, concerning a subject matter capable
of settlement by arbitration." 21 US.T. 2517, art. 11(1) (1970).
220 See supra note 215.
2 923 F.2d 245, 251 (2d Cir. 1991). It is beyond the scope of this Article to com-
ment on whether the Second Circuit decision regarding the preemption of the Vermont
statute is correct. However, the Vermont statute applied to arbitration clauses in con-
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Having held that Threlkeld & Co.'s agreement to arbitrate
was not unenforceable on public policy grounds, the Second Cir-
cuit next determined whether Threlkeld & Co.'s litigation vio-
lated its duty to arbitrate. Although the Second Circuit referred
to the parties' Memo to File, the court did not find an enforcea-
ble agreement to arbitrate in the preliminary agreement. Instead
the court ruled that Threlkeld & Co. had agreed to abide by the
LME Rules when it entered into the metals contracts and the
Terms of Business with MG.222 Threlkeld & Co. had argued that
only one of the two arbitration provisions in the LME
Rules-regulation 10.1 of the Contract Regulations-had any
application to the parties' contracts and that regulation 10.1 did
not require arbitration of the disputes before the court.223 Ac-
cording to this argument, regulation 10.1 did not require arbitra-
tion of the claims in this dispute because none of those issues
"arose out of" any "Contract" as defined in the LME Rules. 224
Threlkeld & Co. stated that its claims for misvaluation arose out
of an oral agreement separate and distinct from the metals con-
tracts. Arguing that the phrase "any dispute ... arising out of
any Contract" should be read narrowly, Threlkeld & Co. con-
tended that regulation 10.1 did not encompass disputes arising
under the oral valuation agreement.2
tracts generally and related to no public policy other than the desire of the Vermont
legislature to protect persons who might enter into arbitration agreements without full
and adequate disclosure and understanding of the implications of their actions. Thus
there was no basis for arguing that Vermont's concern for an urgent matter of public
policy entitled it to legislate an incidental restriction on arbitration that was not incon-
sistent with Congress's concerns in enacting the Arbitration Act. See Southland Corp. v.
Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 17, 18 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Stewart E. Sterk, Enforce-
ability Of Agreements To Arbitrate And Examination of The Public Policy Defense, 2
CARDOZO L. REV. 481 (1981). The result does seem inconsistent, however, with the assur-
ance given by Kearney in his testimony on the Convention before the United States
Senate Foreign Relations Committee to the effect that acceptance of the Convention
would have no effect whatever on state laws because "[flt concerns.., solely the jurisdic-
tion of the Federal district courts." See Foreign Arbitral Awards, S. REP. No. 91-702, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1970); see supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
222 "Threlkeld does not contest the general applicability of the LME rules." 923
F.2d at 247.
22 LME Rules, part 4, reg. 10.1, reprinted in Joint Appendix, supra note 161, at
A50, A84.
22 LME Rules, part 1 ("Definitions and General Rules"), reprinted in Joint Appen-
dix, supra note 161, at A54-59.
22' Brief for Appellee at 8-17, David L. Threlkeld & Co. v. Metallgesellschaft Ltd.,
923 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1991) (No. 90-7480).
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On appeal, however, MG changed the thrust of its argu-
ment.226 Rule 1.1 of the LME Arbitration Rules stated that the
Arbitration Rules applied to "[a]ll disputes arising out of or in
relation to any contract which contains an agreement to refer
disputes to arbitration in accordance with the Rules and Regula-
tions of the London Metal Exchange, or the existence, comple-
tion or validity of the such contract .... ,22  MG argued that the
LME Regulations incorporated the Arbitration Rules into Threl-
keld & Co.'s contracts. MG argued further that Supreme Court
precedent required arbitration clauses to be read broadly when-
ever possible and that the language of rule 1.1 was broad enough
to encompass the oral valuation agreement.
Threlkeld & Co. argued that rule 1.1 was inapplicable on its
face. According to Threlkeld & Co., neither the forward con-
tracts, the Terms of Business nor the Memo to File brought the
Arbitration Rules into play because none of them contained an
"agreement to refer disputes to arbitration in accordance with
the Rules and Regulations of the London Exchange."221 The
Memo to File made no reference to the LME Rules. The metals
contracts and the Terms of Business referred to the LME Rules,
but did not expressly consent to arbitration under those
Rules.
229
The Second Circuit found that the references to the LME
Rules in Threlkeld & Co.'s contracts were sufficient to bind
Threlkeld & Co. to arbitrate its disputes with MG. The court
found that "by incorporating the LME Rules into their contract,
the parties agreed to abide by all the Rules. ' '2 0 Proceeding to
2" Brief for Appellant at 22, Threlkeld, 923 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1991) (No. 90-7480);
Appellant's Reply Brief at 5-8.
217 LME Rules, part 8, at 8-1, § 1.1, reprinted in Joint Appendix, supra note 161, at
A101.
"' Brief for Appellee at 10-11.
29 Id.
10 Threlkeld, 923 F.2d 245, 251. Regulation 1.1 of the Contract Regulations pro-
vides: "These Contract Regulations shall apply to Contracts made subject to the Rules of
the Exchange, whether between Clearing Members or between a Clearing Member and a
Member who is not a Clearing Member or between a Member and any other person."
LME Rules, part 4, reg. 1.1, at 4-1, reprinted at Joint Appendix, supra note 161, at ASo.
Implicit in the court's reasoning is that references in the contracts between Threlkeld &
Co. and MG to the LME Rules had a legal effect of incorporating these rules into the
contracts between the parties. Although the Second Circuit did not explain or analyze
this implicit finding, other cases have come to similar conclusions. See, eg., Prima Paint
v. Flood & Conklin, 388 U.S. 395 (1967); Fleck v. E.F. Hutton Group, 891 F.2d 1047 (2d
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analyze the LME Rules, the Second Circuit declared that "it is
clear that once the parties agreed to abide by the Rules, part 4,
section 10.1 became part of the contract for metals."23 1 Thus the
contracts did contain an agreement to arbitrate in accordance
with the LME Rules, notwithstanding that the agreement did
not appear on the face of the contracts. The Second Circuit held
that the two arbitration provisions contained in the LME Rules
had to be read together and that "the core issue as to arbi-
trability is whether Threlkeld's claims arise out of or relate to
these Threlkeld/MG contracts for metals.
232
Having found that the broader of the two arbitration provi-
sions contained in the LME Rules applied to the contracts at
issue, the Second Circuit next construed the provision's language
liberally, as required by Supreme Court precedent, and found
that the language was "plainly" broad enough to cover the dis-
putes between Threlkeld & Co. and MG.233 The Second Circuit
rejected Threlkeld & Co.'s arguments that its oral valuation
agreement was a "collateral" agreement which was not arbitra-
ble because it did not contain a separate arbitration clause.
Rather, the Second Circuit held that
[t]he forward contracts were the genesis of the parties' relationships;
the alleged collateral agreement stemmed directly from the forward
contracts. The metals contracts between Threlkeld and MG represent
the subject matter of the alleged valuation agreements; absent the for-
ward contracts, the valuation agreement "had no starting point, no




Having found the arbitration agreements to be enforceable,
Cir. 1989); J.J. Ryan & Sons v. Rhone Poulenc Textile S.A., 863 F.2d 315 (4th Cir. 1988);
Coudert v. Paine Webber, 705 F.2d 78 (2d Cir. 1983); Astor Chocolate Corp. v.
Mikroverk, Ltd., 704 F. Supp. 30 (E.D.N.Y. 1989); Pervel Industries v. T.M. Wallcover-
ing, 675 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 871 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1987).
231 923 at F. 2d at 251. Regulation 10.1 of the Contract Regulations provides: "Sub-
ject as provided in Regulation 10.2, any dispute as to the existence, completion or valid-
ity of or arising out of any Contract shall be referred to arbitration in accordance with
the Rules." LME Rules, Contract Regulation 10.1, reprinted in Joint Appendix, supra
note 161, at A84.
"' 923 F.2d at 251 (emphasis added). Regulation 10.1 of the Contract Regulations
provided that "any dispute as to the existence, completion or validity of or arising out of
any Contract shall be referred to arbitration in accordance with the Rules." LME Rules,
part 4, reg. 10.1, reprinted in Joint Appendix, supra note 161, at A84.
13 923 F.2d at 251.
23 923 F.2d at 251-52 (quoting Pervel Industries, Inc. v. T.M. Wallcovering, Inc.,
871 F.2d 7, 8-9 (2d Cir. 1989)).
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however, the Second Circuit declined to instruct the district
court as to how to enforce them. MG had argued that the appro-
priate remedy under the Convention was to dismiss the com-
plaint, instead of staying the action as provided in the Arbitra-
tion Act.2 35 The court noted that there was a split of opinion
within the Second Circuit as to the propriety of dismissing a
case as opposed to issuing a stay, but declined to resolve the
split because the district court had not yet ruled.
Threlkeld & Co. filed a petition for certiorari to the Su-
preme Court, seeking review of the Second Circuit's decision.
However, given the slim chances for any certiorari petition and
the grim prospect of arbitrating before a tribunal that might be
hostile, Threlkeld & Co. negotiated a settlement with MG before
certiorari could be granted or denied by the Court.2 30
III. ANALYSIS OF THRELKELD
The Second Circuit Panel believed that it was faithfully fol-
lowing Supreme Court and Second Circuit precedent in its dis-
position of the issues in Threlkeld. Yet a correct application of
the Arbitration Act by the Second Circuit would have differed
from the Threlkeld decision in at least two significant respects.
A. The Presumption of Arbitrability and Summary Judgment
Standards
It is abundantly clear that in enacting the Arbitration Act
Congress intended all contract parties to receive a fair hearing
on the issue of whether they had entered into an agreement to
arbitrate issues posed in litigation. This right is impaired by the
judicially-imposed presumption of arbitrability.
Section 4 of the Act requires that "[i]f the making of the
arbitration agreement or the failure, neglect, or refusal to per-
' Brief for Appellant at 17-18, David L. Threlkeld & Co. v. Metallgesellschaft Ltd.,
923 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1991) (No. 90-7480). MG downplayed this argument on appeal Id.
at 4. This is no doubt because of its wish to minimize the appearance of justification for
the summary judgment standard adopted by the district court. Id. at 17-18.
"' Telephone conversation with Robert B. Hemley, Counsel for David L. Threlkeld
& Co. (Aug. 17, 1992). On August 2, 1991 the petition for certiorari was dismissed by the
Supreme Court under the parties' stipulation and rule 46 of the Supreme Court Rules.
David L. Threlkeld & Co. v. Metallgesellschaft Ltd., 112 S. Ct. 17 (1991). Threlkeld may
have had good reason to believe that the arbitral panel would be unsympathetic or even
hostile to its claims. See infra notes 287-95 and accompanying text.
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form the same 'be in issue, the court shall proceed summarily to
the trial thereof."237 A party alleged to be in default under an
arbitration agreement can demand a jury trial. If a jury is em-
paneled, it has the power to rule on the questions of whether an
agreement for arbitration was made in writing and whether
there is a default in proceeding under that agreement. Section 4
provides no preference to a party seeking to compel arbitration
over a party resisting arbitration, except in two purely proce-
dural respects. First, a compressed time frame is provided for
the joining of issues on arbitrability. 38 This favors the party
seeking arbitration by reducing the time and expense needed to
move the matter to arbitration. Second, the issues are narrowed
to whether a written contract to arbitrate exists and whether the
agreement has been breached. 3 9 This also favors the party seek-
ing arbitration because it restricts the trial court from consider-
ing the merits of the controversy except as they relate to the
question of arbitrability.
On the other hand, the Act contains two very significant
provisions that were intended to protect the party opposing ar-
bitration. The statutory right to trial was intended to be "am-
ply" protected240 and the right to a jury is given only to the op-
ponent of arbitration. 241 Thus the Act struck a rough balance
between the interests of both parties. There is not one word in
the Act or in its legislative history suggesting that Congress in-
tended the arbitrability hearing to be weighted in favor of either
side.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has imposed a weighty
"presumption of arbitrability" that changes the balance in Arbi-
tration Act cases. The rule that "any doubts concerning the
scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitra-
237 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1947). See Local Union No. 998 v. The B. & T. Metals Co., 315 F.2d
432, 436 (6th Cir. 1963) ("[A] factual issue is involved... and... it would be error if the
District Judge resolved that factual issue in a summary judgment proceeding.").
2"' Although the Act does not provide a time frame within which the arbitrability
issues raised in the pleadings are to be resolved, the policy of the Act clearly suggests
that the arbitrability issue is to be decided in an accelerated fashion, consistent with the
rights of the parties. Thus, if there is ground for trial, the court is required to "proceed
summarily" to trial. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1947).
... A.T. & T. Technologies v. Communications Workers of America, 475 U.S. 643,
649 (1986).
210 H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1924).
2'41 See supra note 25.
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tion"' 24 certainly sends some cases to arbitration that would not
go there under the more traditional balanced standard.' 3
As we have seen, the presumption of arbitrability was first
imposed by the Supreme Court in the context of federal labor
law. 44 A federal common law presumption was needed in the
labor relations field to promote strong congressional policies of
concern for public order and national security. The Supreme
Court devoted eight pages of its eleven-page opinion in Warrior
& Gulf to a discussion of those policies and found clearly that it
was the special role of arbitration within the collective bargain-
ing context that justified the presumptions imposed by the
Court in labor arbitrations in that case.2"
242 Threlkeld, 923 F.2d 245, 248 (2d Cir. 1991), citing Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v.
Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983). The presumption of arbitrability appears
to have the effect of reversing the burden of proof on arbitrability issues. It has the -game
effect on arbitration cases, therefore, that the Supreme Court's decision in The Bremen
v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972), had on choice of forum clause adjudications.
As choice of forum is a common law question, no constitutional impediment existed to
the Supreme Court's revision of the law in Bremen. As a statute, however, the Arbitra-
tion Act is subject to different standards. The judicial revision of the Arbitration Act is
judicial legislation and thereby violates article 1, section 1, of the United States
Constitution.
21 The presumption required by currently prevailing Supreme Court doctrine ele-
vates arbitration clauses above other contractual clauses and in so doing undermines the
intentions of the legislators and bar association representatives who drafted the legisla-
tion. For example, the requirement that all ambiguities be construed in favor of arbi-
trability causes courts to disregard rules of contract construction that, over the years,
have been developed to prevent injustice. A particularly troubling example of this prob-
lem can be found in Finkel & Ross v. A.G. Becker Paribas Inc., 622 F. Supp. 1505
(S.D.N.Y. 1985). In that case, the plaintiffs were investors who signed a form agreement
drafted by the defendant brokerage house. The agreement contained an arbitration
clause stating that "[a]ny controversy between us arising out of, or relating to, any trans-
action for my account shall be settled by arbitration .... "Id. at 1507. The same agree-
ment also contained a non-waiver clause, providing that "[b]y this agreement to arbi-
trate future controversies, I understand that I do not waive any rights I may have under
the Federal securities laws for controversies arising under such laws." Id. at 1509 n.2.
The plaintiffs argued that the non-waiver clause revealed an intention and expectation
on their part to reserve the option either to arbitrate or to litigate claims which might
arise under the federal securities laws. Id. at 1510. Unquestionably, the non-vaiver
clause created an ambiguity in the document with respect to the obligation to arbitrate
securities law claims. The plaintiffs' reading of the non-waiver clause was not unreasona-
ble. Under traditional contract construction rules, ambiguities are to be construed
against the drafter of a document. 3 CORBIN ON Com,'rmAcms 262, § 559 (West 1960). Since
the defendant brokerage firm sought and obtained enforcement of an ambiguous arbitra-
tion clause that it had drafted, the presumption of arbitrability appears to have been
directly responsible for the court's decision to send the matter to arbitration.
244 See supra notes 44-56 and accompanying text.
, United Steel Workers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S.
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That the presumption may have been specifically justifiable
as an aspect of the federal common law of labor-management
relations in no way implies that it is generally supportable in the
interpretation of the Arbitration Act. The Supreme Court had
no clear expression of congressional policy upon which to base
its own program of promoting commercial arbitration. As dis-
cussed, the 1924 Congress was determined to ensure that "[t]he
constitutional right to a jury trial is adequately safeguarded. ' 24
Subsequent Congresses have also been careful to preserve the
parties' right to trial, even when encouraging or mandating arbi-
tration. In 1987, for example, Congress authorized programs of
court-annexed compulsory arbitration in ten district courts.2417
This program addressed identical concerns about judicial work-
load and the burdens of litigation that informed the Supreme
Court's deliberations from Scherk onward.248 Yet like the 1924
Congress, the 1987 Congress unambiguously preserved a party's
right to a trial.
241
The right to a trial is significantly impaired when the proce-
dure for deciding whether such a right exists is biased. The pro-
cedures set forth in sections 3 and 4 of the Arbitration Act make
a party's receipt of any kind of trial dependent upon an assess-
ment of the judge. Section 3 of the Arbitration Act requires a
court to stay a suit or proceeding "upon being satisfied that the
issue involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitra-
tion under . . . an agreement [in writing for arbitration]. ' 2O5
Likewise, part 4 of the Act requires a court to order parties to
proceed to arbitration without a trial "upon being satisfied that
the making of the agreement for arbitration or the failure to
574, 581 (1960). If the 1959 Supreme Court had found that the Arbitration Act justified
the presumption without the assistance of national labor policy, its reasoning in Warrior
& Gulf would have been unnecessary. It would have only been necessary for the Court to
apply the Arbitration Act. That the Court did not apply the Act shows that it did not
believe that the policies underlying the Arbitration Act justified the imposition of a gen-
eral presumption of arbitrability.
218 S. REP. No. 536, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1924).
247 Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, tit. IX, codified at 28 U.S.C. §§
651 et seq.
248 417 U.S. 506, reh'g denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974); see supra notes 108-20 and ac-
companying text.
249 28 U.S.C. section 65 gives a dissatisfied party the right to an impartial jury trial
de novo after the arbitration has concluded. 28 U.S.C. § 65 (1988). See Broderick, supra
note 99, at 3.
2 0 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1947).
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comply therewith is not in issue. "2 51 This initial judicial determi-
nation of arbitrability is critical to the process. If the judge is
"satisfied" that no issue exists concerning the breach of a writ-
ten agreement to arbitrate, then the party resisting arbitration
cannot insist upon a trial. If the initial judicial determination is
affected by a presumption, then the resisting party may be un-
fairly deprived of a jury trial on the issue of arbitrability-and
thus deprived of a trial on the merits of the underlying dispute.
It is in the context of this initial judicial determination that
the presumption of arbitrability has its effect. Such a presump-
tion, in addition to being unfair, is also clearly inconsistent with
congressional intent. Section 6 of the Arbitration Act provides
that "[a]ny application to the court hereunder shall be made
and heard in the manner provided by law for the making and
hearing of motions, except as otherwise herein expressly pro-
vided. 252 If section 6 of the Arbitration Act has any meaning at
all, it must mean that no distinction is to be made between the
hearing of motions under the Arbitration Act and the standard
procedures used in other motions, except to the extent that the
Arbitration Act expressly provides for such a difference.
If presumptions to be applied in Arbitration Act motions
and cases are to be consistent with section 6 of the Act, they
must be the same presumptions that are applied in similar cir-
cumstances under general motion practice. Under sections 3 and
4 of the Arbitration Act, for example, a judicial determination as
to whether a written agreement to arbitrate exists and whether
disputes are within the scope of that agreement is likely to re-
quire parties to introduce oral or written testimony and docu-
mentary evidence, including the written contract.253 The oppo-
251 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1947).
2152 9 U.S.C. § 6 (1947).
253 See, e.g., Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 399
(1967) (matter resolved on affidavits in trial court); Wilko v. Svan, 346 U.S. 427, 429
(1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quilas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc. 490 US.
477 (1989) (affidavit submitted with motion to compel arbitration); McDonnell Douglas
Finance Corp. v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 858 F.2d 825, 833 (2d Cir. 1988) (affi.
davits relied upon to construe arbitration clause); Genesco, Inc. v. T. Kakiuchi & Co.
Ltd., 815 F.2d 840, 845 (2d Cir. 1987) (trial court reviewed "voluminous evidentiary sub-
missions"); Banque de Paris et de Pays-Bas v. Amoco Oil Co., 573 F. Supp. 1464, 1471
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (reciting the "array of evidence" offered in opposition to motion for
arbitration).
One circumstance in which evidence of this kind might not be nece-ssary is when the
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nent of the motion is also likely to introduce testimony and
documentary evidence. When consideration of this kind of evi-
dence 'is necessary, it is proper for a judge to treat the motion as
one for summary judgment and to apply the standards imposed
by Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.254
There is nothing in section 3 of the Act that is inconsistent
with treating the motion for a stay as if it were a motion for
summary judgment. Indeed a stay of litigation pending the arbi-
tration of issues that would otherwise be resolved in litigation
has a preclusive effect that is often the substantial equivalent of
summary judgment in the matter. The court that stays the ac-
tion may never hear from the litigants again because their dis-
pute may settle or may be resolved entirely in arbitration and
enforced either without further litigation or by an action in an-
other venue.255 Yet the decision to send a matter to arbitration
may cause a result opposite to that which would have occurred
in court; it may turn a winner into a loser and leave substantial
legal rights unvindicated.256 If the parties do return to court for
enforcement of an arbitral award, the court will not have the
power to review the facts de novo. The court's review will be
limited to the matters referred to in sections 10,257 11258 or 207259
complaint itself attaches a written agreement which contains an arbitration clause. In
that case, a motion to dismiss under rule 12(b)(1) might be made without affidavits or
other evidence.
2 FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c). See also Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc.,
271 F.2d 402, 404 (2d Cir. 1959) ("[a]ccording to Lawrence, whose version of the fraud
we must accept in the present posture of the case . . . .") (emphasis added).
255 Article III of the Convention obligates contracting states to "recognize arbitral
awards as binding and enforce them." Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement
of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, art. III, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 2519.
255 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 629
(1985) ("[W]e enforce the parties' agreement, even assuming that a contrary result would
be forthcoming in a domestic [read: judicial] context."); Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Com-
pany of America, Inc., 350 U.S. 198, 203 (1956) ("The change from a court of law to an
arbitration panel may make a radical difference in ultimate result.").
25 Section 10 of the Arbitration Act reads as follows:
§10. Same; vacation; grounds; rehearing
In either of the following cases the United States court in and for the district
wherein the award was made may make an order vacating the award upon the
application of any party to the arbitration -
(a) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue
means.
(b) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitra-
tors, or either of them.
(c) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to
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of the Arbitration Act.
The stay procedures of section 3 must be read together with
the statutory standards set forth in section 4 for summary pre-
trial disposition of the arbitrability issue.200 Those standards
forbid the court to order arbitration without trial "[i]f the mak-
ing of the arbitration agreement or the failure, neglect, or refusal
postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear
evidence pertinent and material to the controversy, or of any other mis-
behavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced.
(d) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly
executed them that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject
matter submitted was not made.
(e) Where an award is vacated and the time within which the agree-
ment required the award to be made has not expired the court may, in
its discretion, direct a rehearing by the arbitrators.
9 U.S.C. § 10 (1947).
2 Section 11 of the Arbitration Act reads as follow:
§ 11. Same; modification or correction; grounds; order
In either of the following cases the United States court in and for the district
wherein the award was made may make an order modifying or correcting the
award upon the application of any party to the arbitration -
(a) Where there was an evident material miscalculation of figures or
an evident material mistake in the description of any person, thing, or
property referred to in the award.
(b) Where the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submit-
ted to them, unless it is a matter not affecting the merits of the decision
upon the matter submitted.
(c) Where the award is imperfect in matter of form not affecting the
merits of the controversy.
The order may modify and correct the award, so as to effect the intent
thereof and promote justice between the parties.
9 U.S.C. § 11 (1947).
" Section 207 of the Arbitration Act reads as follows:
§ 207. Award of arbitrators; confirmation; jurisdiction; proceeding;
Within three years after an arbitral award falling under the Convention is
made, any party to the arbitration may apply to any court having jurisdiction
under this chapter for an order confirming the award as against any other
party to the arbitration. The court shall confirm the award unless it finds one
of the grounds for refusal or deferral of recognition or enforcement of the
award specified in the said Convention.
9 U.S.C. § 207 (1970). Article V of the Convention sets forth grounds upon which recog-
nition and enforcement of an arbitral award may be refused. See supra note 90.
"I Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1959)
(trial required if issues are raised in section 3 motion for stay); Bernhardt v. Polygraphic
Company of America, Inc., 350 U.S. 198, 201 (1956) (section 3 must be read together
with sections I and 2 of the Act). "Any other reading would give the lie to the belief of
the framers of the Act that "[t]he constitutional right to a jury trial is adequately safe-
guarded." S. REP. No. 536, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1924).
1992]
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
to perform the same be in issue."'26 1 This language cannot be in-
terpreted as being any more permissive as a standard than sum-
mary judgment standards, at least from the standpoint of the
moving party. After all, Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure requires a party seeking judgments to show only
"that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that




It is standard procedure in motions for summary judgment
that in determining whether there is a genuine issue as to any
material fact, the court is required to resolve all ambiguities and
to draw all factual inferences in favor of the party against whom
summary judgment is sought.63 Section 6 of the Arbitration Act
requires the observance of all rules normally followed in disposi-
tive motions of this type, including the rule that inferences be
drawn in favor of the party opposing the motion to compel arbi-
tration. The rule of favoring the nonmoving party must apply to
construction of the arbitration agreement as well as to other dis-
puted facts. Section 4 requires that if "an issue is raised" relat-
ing to arbitration, a party alleged to be in default may have a
jury trial with respect to the issue.264 At such a trial it is for the
jury to determine whether "an agreement for arbitration was
made in writing" and whether "there is a default in proceeding
thereunder.
'265
The determination of whether a default exists under a con-
tract necessarily involves the interpretation of the language of
the contract. Since the statute clearly assigns the "default" issue
to the jury, it appears that the interpretation of ambiguous arbi-
tration contracts is a matter of fact for the jury, rather than a
matter of law to be determined by the court.266 Thus application
of the presumption of arbitrability in pretrial motions under sec-
tions 3 and 4 of the Arbitration Act appears to conflict squarely
with the right to trial granted by section 4 of the Act and the
right to fair procedures recognized in section 6 of the Act.
2'1 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1947).
282 FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (emphasis added).
22 Rattner v. Netburn, 930 F.2d 204, 209 (2d Cir. 1991) (per Kearse, J.); Branum v.
Clark, 927 F.2d 698, 704 (2d Cir. 1991) (per Kearse, J., with McLaughlin and Pratt, JJ.).
2 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1947).
282 Id.
288 See Saturday Evening Post Co. v. Rumbleseat Press, Inc., 816 F.2d 1191, 1196
(7th Cir. 1987) (contract not ambiguous).
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The presumptions required by currently prevailing Supreme
Court doctrine elevate arbitration clauses above other contrac-
tual clauses and disregard the express intentions of the legisla-
tors who drafted and enacted the Arbitration Act. The legisla-
tive history of the Act defies any interpretation that would alter,
twist or bend the intentions of the contracting parties to serve
judicial notions of public policy:
Arbitration agreements are purely matters of contract, and the effect
of the bill is simply to make the contracting party live up to his agree-
ment. He can no longer refuse to perform his contract when it be-
comes disadvantageous to him. An arbitration agreement is placed
upon the same footing as other contracts, where it belongs.'
0 7
District Judge Coffrin properly denied MG's motions be-
cause he found there was "a reasonable basis for a difference of
opinion" regarding MG's claims. 6 8 In fact, the Second Circuit
agreed with much of his analysis: it followed his lead in giving
no effect to the Memo to File and relied only indirectly upon
section 10.1 of the LME Contract Regulations in finding an en-
forceable obligation to exist. The issue on which Judge Coffrin
was reversed was one that was not vigorously argued before the
district court.
Where Judge Coffrin erred was in failing to order a trial, to
commence soon thereafter, on the merits of the arbitrability is-
sues in the case.26 9 Section 4 of the Act clearly called for a trial
to take place in a speedy manner if the judge decided that issues
existed with respect to arbitrability. At trial summary judgment
standards would not have applied. MG and Threlkeld & Co.
would have had to prove their cases by a preponderance of the
evidence standard, just as at any other civil trial. Although MG
failed to prevail under a summary judgment standard, it might
very well have prevailed at trial in the district court under a
"reasonable preponderance of the evidence" standard. Moreover,
had MG pressed the court to schedule a mini-trial on the arbi-
tration issue, as it was entitled to do, it might have resolved the
26HR. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1924) (emphasis added).
288 David L. Threlkeld & Co. v. Metallgesellschaft Ltd., No. 90-28, slip-op. at 14 (D.
Vt. Apr. 30, 1990), reprinted in Joint Appendix, supra note 161, at A250.
269 Since Threlkeld & Co. had demanded a jury trial in its complaint, it was entitled
to a jury on a mini-trial of the arbitrability issues under section 4 of the Arbitration Act.
9 U.S.C. §§ 3, 4 (1947); Fpm. . Cxv. P. 38(b).
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issue of arbitrability sooner than it ultimately did. Judge Cof-
frin's order was filed on April 30, 1990. The Second Circuit's
opinion in the case was released on January 15, 1991. It should
not have taken eight and one half months to schedule and hold a
mini-trial on the issue of arbitrability. Any such delay would
have constituted a denial of MG's right to a speedy trial under
section 4. Thus, even without any further action on the part of
MG, Judge Coffrin should have moved immediately to schedule
a mini-trial, together with whatever expedited discovery pro-
ceedings that the parties may have needed. It was the district
court's failure to do so that gave rise to MG's right of appeal.2 7
The court of appeals found that the district court had erred
in applying summary judgment standards "since there was no
question that an agreement to arbitrate existed and that arbitra-
tion was refused. '27 1 Here, the Second Circuit applied the wrong
standard.
270 An order denying a stay or an application for an order compelling arbitration is
appealable. Noidin v. NutrilSystem, Inc., 897 F.2d 339, 342 (8th Cir. 1990); Kansas Gas
& Electric Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 861 F.2d 420, 422 (4th Cir. 1988). Where the
district court's order denying the motion constitutes a judgment on the merits of the
arbitrability issue, then such a right of appeal is in order. However, where the district
court declines to order a stay or to dismiss the case in favor of arbitration due to the
existence of genuine issues of material fact, section 4 of the Arbitration Act requires that
"the court ... proceed summarily to the trial" of such issues. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1947). There-
fore, an order denying summary judgment on the issue of arbitrability is a preliminary
order and should not be considered a "final order" for purposes of appeal. Instead, the
parties should be required to proceed to trial of the arbitrability issue. The result of the
trial would be appealable.
27 Threlkeld, 923 F.2d 245, 248-49 (2d Cir. 1991). One set of facts developed in the
affidavits before the district court, but not pursued on appeal, might have created a tria-
ble jury issue as to whether an agreement to arbitrate disputes existed with respect to
approximately one half of the metals contracts at issue. MG's withdrawal from trading
on the COMEX necessitated a complicated series of adjustments between Threlkeld &
Co. and MG with respect to Threlkeld & Co.'s copper positions. These positions origi-
nally had been in the form of "futures" contracts on the COMEX. Although an affidavit
submitted on behalf of MG referred to these as "forward" contracts following MG's
withdrawal from COMEX, sufficient ambiguity existed in the record to create an issue as
to whether the copper contracts in effect between the parties were "futures" or "for-
ward" contracts. If they were "futures," they could not have been "Contracts" under the
LME definitions since the LME did not prescribe a form for "futures" contracts. How-
ever, Threlkeld & Co. waived making this argument when it represented to the trial
court that "[t]he distinction between 'forward' and 'futures' contracts is ... not relevant
to the issues raised ... ." Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law, at 3 n.2, David L. Threlkeld
& Co. v. Metallgesellschaft Ltd. (D. Vt. 1990) (No. 90-28) (Plaintiff's memorandum in




Under sections 3 and 4 of the Act the standard is not
whether arbitration was refused, but whether there has been
"failure, neglect or refusal to perform" an arbitration agree-
ment. 2 This means that the facts to be determined-and to be
sent to a jury if they are in issue-include the question of
whether a refusal to proceed to arbitration constituted a default
under the agreement to arbitrate.
The Second Circuit found and resolved at least two triable
issues of fact. First, it was not at all clear that the Terms of
Business or the metals contracts constituted "contract[s] which
contain an agreement to refer disputes to arbitration in accor-
dance with the Rules and Regulations of the London Metal Ex-
change," as required to apply rule 1.1 of the LME Arbitration
Rules. Second, it was unclear as to whether the alleged oral
valuation agreement was a "dispute arising out of or in relation
to" the metals contracts or the Terms of Business.7 4 These is-
sues gave rise to a right of trial by jury under section 4. The
district court's decision should have been affirmed, with direc-
tions to Judge Coffrin to proceed summarily to trial under 9
U.S.C. section 4.
B. The Presumption of Conscionability
Congress did not make all arbitration clauses valid, irrevo-
cable and enforceable in the Arbitration Act of 1925. Section 2
of the Act provides an exception based upon "such grounds as




The Supreme Court described these grounds in its Mitsubishi
Motors decision:
A party resisting arbitration of course may attack directly the validity
of the agreement to arbitrate .... [Mioreover, the party may attempt
2 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1947) (emphasis added). The text of section 3 is to the same effect:
"the court ... upon being satisfied that the issue involved... is referable to arbitration
under such an agreement, shall ... stay the trial ... ." 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1947) (emphasis
added).
11 LME Rules, part 8, rule 1.1, at 8-1, reprinted in Joint Appendix, supra note 161,
at A101.
17' Id. See also LME Rules, part 4, section 1.3, reprinted in Joint Appendix, supra
note 161, at A80. See Krell v. Gruntal & Co., 646 F. Supp. 1056, 1057 (ED. Pa. 1986)
(ordering trial because language of contract and application for employment are ambigu-
ous, despite clear language of stock exchange rules).
275 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1925).
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to make a showing that would warrant setting aside the forum-selec-
tion clause-that the agreement was "(a)ffected by fraud, undue influ-
ence, or overweening bargaining power"; that "enforcement would be
unreasonable and unjust"; or that proceedings in the "contractual fo-
rum will be so gravely difficult and inconvenient that [the resisting
party] will for all practical purposes be deprived of his day in
court.
12 76
The Convention, likewise, provides that a court may refuse to
send a matter to arbitration if "it finds that the [agreement to
arbitrate] is null and void, inoperative, or incapable of being
performed.
2 77
Threlkeld & Co. attempted to raise one of the section 2 ex-
ceptions to enforceability when it claimed that the obligation to
arbitrate claims imposed by the LME Rules was a contract of
adhesion. The Second Circuit dismissed this claim, labeling
Threlkeld & Co. a "sophisticated commodities trader. '278 Yet
such an appellation does not end the inquiry into whether the
contract was one of adhesion.
If one considers the partiality of the arbitral tribunal to
which the arbitration clause requires claims to be sent, it seems
at least a triable jury question whether the agreement to arbi-
trate was a contract of adhesion. Supreme Court and other
precedents justify an inquiry into the composition of an arbitral
panel to determine whether the panel is composed of "compe-
tent, conscientious and impartial arbitrators. ' '27 9 Frequently
courts have examined the composition of arbitral panels before
sending matters to arbitration to determine whether the panel
would in all likelihood be capable of handling the matters before
it in a fair and evenhanded fashion.2 80 The Court has considered
276 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 632
(1985), quoting The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 12, 15, 18 (1972).
277 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards, June 10,
1958, art. 11 (3), 21 U.S.T. 2517, 2519 (1958).
217 Threlkeld, 923 F.2d 245, 249 (2d Cir. 1991).
271 In Mitsubishi the Supreme Court stated: "[W]e decline to indulge the presump-
tion that the parties and arbitral body conducting a proceeding will be unable or unwill-
ing to retain competent, conscientious and impartial arbitrators." 473 U.S. at 634.
2180 See, e.g., A.T.& T. Technologies v. Communications Workers of America, 475
U.S. 643, 645 (1986) (agreement calling for references to "a mutually agreeable arbitra-
tor"); Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 634 n.18 (describing arbitration panel); Southland Corp. v.
Keating 465 U.S. 1, 4 (1984) (arbitration clause calling for arbitration under American
Automobile Association Rules); Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp.,
460 U.S. 1, 5 (1983) (arbitration clause calling for arbitration under rule of American
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the composition of the panel even in cases in which the imparti-
ality of that panel has not been significantly controverted. 81
As Threlkeld & Co.'s brief informed the court, the LME
Regulations made void provisions of any metals contract that
purported to exclude, or were otherwise in conflict with, the
LME's Contract Regulations.282 The Second Circuit interpreted
those Contract Regulations to include an obligation to arbitrate
all disputes arising out of or in relation to any contracts for met-
als or other contracts that contained agreements to refer the dis-
putes to arbitration in accordance with the LME Rules.8 3
Therefore Threlkeld & Co. had no power to contract out of an
obligation to arbitrate any disputes under LME Rules.28  Al-
though arbitration clauses may, in some cases, be fully negoti-
ated, they are frequently contained in form agreements where
there is little or no negotiation.28 5 Especially when it is unclear
whether there was negotiation of, or informed consent to, the
arbitration contract, courts should examine the composition and
Automobile Association); Scherk v. Alberto Culver, 417 U.S. 506, 509 n.1 (1974) (re-
printing arbitration clause calling for coverage by the rules of the International Chamber
of Commerce); Prima Paint v. Flood & Conklin, 388 U.S. 395, 398 (1967) (calling for
arbitration under rules of American Automobile Association); Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S.
427, 432 n.15 (1953) (quoting arbitration clause which provided claimant with choices of
three arbitration forums); McDonnell Douglas Finance v. Pennsylvania Power & Light,
858 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1988) (examining identity of arbitral panels in deciding that parties
do not intend to send certain disputes to panel identified in document).
21 For example, in Mitsubishi, the Court noted that no attempt had been made to
establish a showing which would warrant setting aside the forum.selection clause on the
basis that enforcement would be unreasonable and unjust or that proceedings in the
contractual forum would be so gravely difficult and inconvenient that they would, in
effect, deprive the resisting party of his day in court. 473 U.S. at 632-33.
282 See LME Rules, part 4, rule 1.3, at 4-1, reprinted in Joint Appendix, supra note
161, at A80.
2" See LE Rules, part 4, rules 1.3, 10.1; LME Rules, part 8, rule 1.1, reprinted in
Joint Appendix, supra note 161, at A80, A84 & A101.
I This brings the Threlkeld/MG contract within the common sense definition of a
contract of adhesion voiced by Congressman Edward J. Markey in the course of hearings
on arbitration reform: "The first question is whether arbitration clauses are contracts of
adhesion, granting to the customer no choice but to sign if he wishes to participate in
our securities markets." Arbitration Reform Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Tele-
communications and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 100th
Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (March 31, 1988) (statement of Hon. Edward J. Markey, Chairman)
(emphasis added).
I "Most of the firms that required arbitration clauses in account agreements with
individual and institutional investors never or almost never waived or negotiated the
clauses." U.S. General Accounting Office ("GAO"), Securities Arbitration: How In-
vestors Fare 30 (May 1992).
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rules of the arbitral forum to be assured of its fairness before
referring an unwilling party.286 .Threlkeld & Co.'s reluctance to go to arbitration before the
LME arbitral panel suggests it believed that it would fare better
in a judicial proceeding than it would before an arbitral tribunal.
Certain matters in the record before the Second Circuit provide
support for this fear. Had Threlkeld & Co. dug a little deeper, it
might have discovered sufficient evidence to require a trial on
the question of whether it was likely to receive a fair and impar-
tial hearing before the LME arbitration panel.
The arbitration rules of the LME require that arbitrators on
its arbitration panels be "directors or members of the staff of
corporate members of the [London Metals Exchange], or indi-
vidual, or honorary members of the Exchange."287 The arbitra-
tion rules provide that each party shall appoint an arbitrator to
a panel of two arbitrators which shall hear the arbitral proceed-
ing. A third arbitrator may be appointed by the LME in consul-
tation with the existing arbitrators upon application either by a
party to the dispute or by one of the arbitrators. 288 This method
of choosing an arbitral panel appears, on its face, to be less fair
and evenhanded than the standard method of choosing arbitral
panels employed in international arbitration.
The method of choosing arbitrators designated by the LME
Rules suggests that each party is encouraged to choose a non-
neutral arbitrator2 e to represent its interests in the arbitra-
286 One ground for rejecting an arbitral award is the partiality of arbitrators. Shear-
son/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 258 (1987) (partiality on the part
of arbitrators a basis for vacating an arbitration award) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). How-
ever, if a showing can be made before the reference to arbitration that there is a signifi-
cant likelihood that the arbitrators may be partial to one party over another, the court
ought not to order arbitration in the first place.
20l LME Rules, part 8, rule 2.1, at 8-2, reprinted in Joint Appendix, supra note 161,
at A102.
2 LME Rules, part 8, rule 1.4, at 8-1, reprinted in Joint Appendix, supra note 161,
at A101.
289 Canon VII of the AAA/ABA 1977 Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial
Disputes provides that "[uln all arbitrations in which there are two or more party.ap-
pointed arbitrators, it is important for everyone concerned to know from the start,
whether the party-appointed arbitrators are expected to be neutrals or non-neutrals. In
such arbitrations, the two party-appointed arbitrators should be considered non-neutrals
unless both parties inform the arbitrators that all three arbitrators are to be neutral, or
unless the contract, the applicable arbitration rules, or any governing law requires that
all three arbitrators are to be neutral." Reprinted in HOUSTON PUTNAM LOWRY, CmrCAL
DocuMENTs SOURCEBOOK ANNOTATED: INTERNATIONAL COMMERcIAL LAW AND ARBiTRATION
[Vol. 58:279
PRESUMPTION OF ARBITRABILITY
tion.29 0 While the provision that each party may choose an arbi-
trator gives a superficial appearance of fairness and evenhanded-
ness to the composition of a panel, the appearance of fairness is
blemished by the limitation on the pool from which arbitrators
may be chosen.29 1 MG, as an LME member, might reasonably be
presumed to know other members of the Exchange better than
Threlkeld & C0.292 An LME member in MG's position should be
capable of finding another member of the Exchange with whom
it is on friendly terms and who may be expected to represent its
position in the arbitration aggressively. According to one ob-
server of the English arbitration system,
certain English arbitrators make a (semi-)profession of arbitrating
and keep themselves available as arbitrators for certain parties more
or less on a retainer basis. Some parties, who are regularly involved in
arbitrations thereby reserve those arbitrators for themselves who have
513, 523 (1991). See J. GunLis WrrER, THE INTERNATIONAL Ai nr.R Paocss PuBuc
AND PRIVATE 364-68 (1979).
90 Robert Van Delden, English Commodity Arbitrations: A Foreigner Looking
Around in London, in THE ART OF ARBrrRATION. EssAys ON INTERNATio N, ARBTATzoN
95, 105-106 (Jan C. Schultz et. al. eds., 1982). This situation has been discussed by fed-
eral courts in the context of the Arbitration Act. See, e.g., In re Utility Oil Corp., 10 F.
Supp. 678, 681 (S.D.N.Y. 1934) ("In the conduct of arbitrations it sometimes happens
that an arbitrator puts loyalty to his nominator above his duty to be impartial .... With
all the arbitrators representing one party only, the party unrepresented would in some
cases be at the mercy of his opponent and the result a foregone conclusion.").
291 Although the Supreme Court has cautioned that American businsses should not
expect to be able to conduct all of their international transactions "exclusively on our
terms, governed by our laws, and resolved in our courts," The Bremen v. Zapata Off-
Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1972), it nevertheless has left the door open for claims that the
selection of an arbitral forum may be unfair. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler
Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 633 (1985). American and (in the absence of strong con-
flicting evidence) presumably international notions of fairness are reflected in the man-
ner in which rules for choosing arbitral panels are regulated by the United States Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission ("SEC"). Under SEC rules, the majority of members of a
securities arbitration panel are required to be from outside the securities industry. Uni-
form Code of Arbitration, Fifth Report of the Securities Industry Conference on Arbi-
tration Ex. C, 29, 31 § 8(a) (Apr. 1986). This system has been criticized recently as being
too lax because the securities exchanges administering the system lack sufficient internal
controls to verify the backgrounds of "public" arbitrators. See GAO, supra note 285, at
55-57. Several dissenting members of the Supreme Court in Shearson/American Express
Inc. v. McMahon thought that even the protections offered by SEC oversight might be
inadequate to assure investors that an individual arbitral panel was not a "stacked
deck." 482 U.S. 220, 260-61 (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan and Marshall,
.92 Threlkeld & Co. had been formed only the year before it began to do business
with MG and it had employed the service of only two other members of the Exchange for
trading on the LME.
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a reputation of expertise and a certain fighting spirit. To prevent this
from happening would, to my view, already justify a legal provision
against appointment of arbitrators by the parties themselves.29 3
As a customer, Threlkeld & Co. could not reasonably be
presumed to have any allies or friends on the LME; nor could
Threlkeld & Co. reasonably be presumed to be able to locate an
enemy of MG to serve as its arbitrator (assuming that was desir-
able).2 e4 Likewise, Threlkeld could not reasonably be expected to
know which members of the LME panel of arbitrators would
have a tendency to act more, rather than less, aggressively and
vigorously as an advocate for its position. Thus Threlkeld & Co.
was at a disadvantage in the choice of an arbitrator to represent
its interest in its LME arbitration.295
The inequality that is found in the rules governing the com-
position of LME arbitral panels has no parallel in the rules gov-
erning the make-up of arbitral panels under the most fre-
293 Van Delden, supra note 290, at 105-06. This commentator, referring to "the evil
of party appointed arbitrators," said that he had experienced an encounter with "fight-
ing arbitrators" to be "so shocking" that he now believed legislation was appropriate to
abolish the system. Id. at 105 n.22.
2" One critic of the arbitration process in the United States securities industry had
the following to say:
The brokerage industry is a closely-knit group and are more likely to protect
one another than to punish a fellow firm. After all, the industry representative
arbitrator might some day have to look for another job and what will his pros-
pects be if he has determined that a fellow member on the street was a RICO
violator or that he has awarded punitive damages or even treble damages. To
take this a step further, it is quite possible that the very same fraudulent activ-
ities which the claimant is alleging are standard operating procedures at the
arbitrator's house. You can see the conflicts that the industry arbitrator will
have.
Arbitration Reform Hearing 19 (statement of Theodore G. Eppenstein) (March 31,
1988). If this statement accurately describes arbitrator/brokers in the United States se-
curities arbitration context, it may also fairly describe arbitrator/brokers in the English
commodities arbitration context.
2" The President of the Arbitration Commission of the International Chamber of
Commerce was critical of this aspect of arbitration conducted by organizations like the
LME:
An important sector of administered arbitration rests with trade association in
arbitration between their members. These are cases where the freedom of
choice of an arbitrator may be impeached, where some sort of self-justice may
be practiced not at all congenial to the very sense of arbitration, [or] where
pressure may be exercised on members to be put on a black list, if they do not
comply with the outcome of arbitration proceedings.
Ottoarndt Glossner, Sociological Aspects of International Commercial Arbitration, in
Schultz, supra note 290, at 149.
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quently-used procedures governing international commercial
arbitration. For example, under the rules imposed by the Inter-
national Chamber of Commerce ("ICC"), the ICC Court of Arbi-
tration either appoints a sole arbitrator to oversee disputes be-
tween parties or appoints a third arbitrator after the parties
have chosen their own arbitrators to represent their positions.216
The ICC Rules contain no provision limiting the parties in their
choice of arbitrators. Similarly, under the United Nations Com-
mission on International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL") Arbitra-
tion Rules, each party appoints an arbitrator of its own choos-
ing. The two arbitrators then choose a third to preside over the
arbitration or an "appointing authority" may designate the third
arbitrator if the other two arbitrators are unable to do so.2 A
somewhat different, but equally neutral, procedure is employed
under the rules of the American Arbitration Association
("AAA"). The AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules permit the
parties to choose their own arbitrators. If the parties are unable
to agree upon the choice of an arbitral panel, then the AAA will
choose a panel from a list of arbitrators that has been reviewed
by parties to the arbitration. The parties are given an opportu-
nity to reject names from the list that they deem unacceptable
and they may rank the others.298
An obligation to refer disputes to an unequally chosen panel
imposed by a non-negotiable arbitration rule that is incorpo-
rated by reference in a non-negotiated form contract that makes
no express mention of arbitration should raise enough of a fac-
tual issue of fairness to justify a jury trial on the issue of uncon-
scionability. However, the presumption of arbitrability makes it
very difficult for a meritorious claim of likely bias to prevail.
29
The Threlkeld case illustrates the need for the various ex-
ceptions to arbitrability to be considered jointly and not in isola-
tion from each other. The Second Circuit found that the LME
2 ICC Rules of Arbitration, arts. 2 & 3 (1988), reprinted in Lowy, supra note 289,
at 397-98.
2 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, art 7(1) & (2), reprinted in LowRy, supra note
289, at 372, 375-76.
299 American Arbitration Association, AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules 4, 13, 14
and 15 (Jan. 1, 1990), reprinted in LowRY, supra note 289, at 448, 452-53.
299 See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 516 (1974): "A contractual provi-
sion specifying in advance the forum in which disputes shall be litigated ... obviates the
danger that a dispute under the agreement might be submitted to a forum hostile to the
interests of one of the parties or unfamiliar with the problem area involved."
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arbitration clause was not a contract of adhesion because Threl-
keld & Co. was a "sophisticated" investor. However, if the Court
had considered the evidence that Threlkeld & Co. offered in
support of its adhesion contract claim-namely, its complete
lack of power to negotiate the arbitration clause-together with
the danger of partiality in the rules limiting the choice of arbi-
trators, the Second Circuit might have found a basis for ruling
that it would be unconscionable for Threlkeld & Co. to arbitrate
its claims before an LME arbitral tribunal.
C. Dismissal or Stay in Aid of Arbitration
MG moved before the district court for dismissal of Threl-
keld & Co.'s lawsuit or, in the alternative, for an order staying
the district court action and ordering Threlkeld & Co. to pro-
ceed to arbitrate its claims against MG.300 MG argued that dis-
missal was the proper remedy for international arbitration cases
governed by the Convention because the "Convention does not
provide for the forum court retaining jurisdiction after it has or-
dered arbitration. '" 30 1 The Second Circuit declined to rule on
whether an order dismissing the case or a stay of the case pend-
ing arbitration was a more appropriate remedy under the Con-
vention. The district court never ruled on the issue because the
parties settled before it had the opportunity to do so.
There are many considerations involved in deciding whether
to dismiss the case or stay it in aid of arbitration. Not every case
should be decided in the same manner. Some factors might
make it appropriate for the trial court to retain jurisdiction over
the matter and to stay the action pending arbitration. If, for ex-
ample, one of the parties is located within the territorial juris-
diction of a court and a possible outcome of the arbitration
would be the need to enforce an arbitral award against that
party, then a court that already possesses personal jurisdiction
over all the parties would be well-placed to aid in the eventual
enforcement of an arbitral award. This is certainly in keeping
with the spirit of the Convention, which has the enforcement of
arbitral awards as its key policy.
Retention of jurisdiction over the dispute also has the ad-
300 Brief for Appellant at 5, David L. Threlkeld & Co. v. Metallgesellschaft Ltd., 923
F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1991) (No. 90-7480).
'0' Id. at 18.
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vantage of permitting the court that ordered arbitration to re-
view the results of its order. Should the parties come before it
again to enforce the arbitration award, the court will already be
apprised of the considerations that led the parties to arbitration.
The court that ordered arbitration may be in a better position
than most other potential judicial panels to determine whether
grounds exist to deny enforcement of the arbitral award.
On the other hand, in some cases the court having jurisdic-
tion in the location where the arbitral panel is to conduct its
proceedings will have a stronger connection to the businesses of
the parties and to the locations of their assets and their evidence
than the sending court will have. In such a case it may make
more sense for the sending court to leave the parties to the rem-
edies available elsewhere. The court having jurisdiction in the
place of arbitration is likely to be more familiar than the sending
court with the manner in which the arbitral panel conducts its
proceedings and chooses its members. Such a court is also more
likely to be able to compel testimony before the arbitrators, if
local arbitral procedures permit such a process, and to deter-
mine the merits of a claim that there was a substantial defect in
the way the factors linking the arbitration was conducted. In
each case it seems appropriate for the sending court to receive
evidence regarding both the factors linking the arbitrating par-
ties to the various courts available to oversee the arbitral process
and the extent of local judicial oversight given to arbitral pro-
ceedings under the arbitral forum's local laws. 0 2
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has engaged in judicial legislation in its
expansion of the United States Arbitration Act. The "emphatic
federal policy"3 03 to which the Supreme Court has given voice is
primarily a judicial policy, as opposed to a congressional policy.
Where Congress has spoken on the same topic, it has always
been careful to preserve the evenhandedness of its approach to
302 Such an inquiry need not delay the commencement of arbitral proceedings.
There is no reason why a sending court could not order the parties before it to proceed
to arbitrate their claims, reserving the issue of whether to dismiss or stay the proceeding
for later decision.




the rights of litigants. The Supreme Court's arbitration policy
has been less careful to protect the contractual and procedural
rights of the parties before it.
The Second Circuit's decision in David L. Threlkeld & Co.
v. Metallgesellschaft Ltd. followed present Supreme Court doc-
trine and rhetoric too literally. It also paid too little heed to the
balance of competing equities reflected in the Arbitration Act.
As a result, Threlkeld & Co. was deprived of a right to trial
promised in the Arbitration Act, a trial that might have kept it
out of a forum it had reason to mistrust. The result for the law
is that district courts in the Second Circuit now have misleading
instructions about the procedures and standards to observe in
motions to compel arbitration.
In Threlkeld the Second Circuit lost sight of the basic di-
lemma that is posed whenever enforcement of an arbitration
clause is in question. At stake is nothing less then the parties'
fundamental right to due process of law in consideration of their
disputes. If a court orders arbitration of issues that parties have
not contractually agreed to arbitrate, the parties are deprived of
their right to trial-a deprivation that may mean the difference
between vindication and defeat, and between justice and finan-
cial ruin.304 Instead they may be sent to a panel of non-lawyers
or non-judges who lack the power or experience to give their
claims a fully informed hearing. For this reason parties resisting
arbitration are entitled to a fair and evenhanded hearing on the
issues of whether they entered into an agreement to arbitrate
and whether they are in default under that agreement. This is
what was intended by Congress in the Arbitration Act.300 The
presumption of arbitrability imposed by Supreme Court prece-
dent renders the judicial hearing given these issues unfair and
uneven. It unwisely alters the balance between litigants in order
to lighten judicial dockets and to promote a misguided under-
standing of international comity. In rewriting the Arbitration
Act, the Supreme Court has usurped the role of Congress.306 The
304 See Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198, 203 (1956).
305 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1947).
306 THE FEDERALisT No. XLVII at 247 (A. Hamilton, J. Jay & J. Madison) (P. Dut-
ton & Co., ed., 1942) ("Were the power of judging joined with the legislative, the life and
liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control, for the judge would then be
the legislator.") (quoting the writings of Montesquieu) (emphasis in original).
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presumption of arbitrability unfairly deprives litigants of their
day in court.

